25 candidates in the fashion of a political party.” Tr. of Oral Arg. at 4. A The rules set forth in §§ 106.6(c), 106.6(f), and 100.57 contain five relevant provisions. In our judgment, the provisions are not closely drawn to meet an important governmental interest.14 14 We need not decide whether the regulations are subject to the strictest scrutiny applicable to spending restrictions or the still “rigorous” but slightly lesser “closely drawn” scrutiny applicable to contribution restrictions. See generally Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2770-72 (2008); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976). Under either permutation of this “exacting” scrutiny, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16, the regulations violate the First Amendment. That said, the allocation and “mere reference” regulations of §§ 106.6(c) and 106.6(f) are best considered spending restrictions under the analysis set forth in Wisconsin Right to Life. 551 U.S. at 457, 477 n.9, 47879; see also Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 203 (1981) (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (limits on donations to non-profits subject to strict scrutiny). In Wisconsin Right to Life, the Court indicated that forcing an entity to spend out of a segregated fund subject to source and amount limitations, rather than its general treasury, was a spending restriction. 551 U.S. at 477 n.9. So too here. Unlike BCRA’s rules for political parties, moreover, these regulations do not limit how much someone can contribute to EMILY’s List or other covered non-profits. Rather, these regulations force non-profit entities to pay for a large percentage of their varied political activities out of hard-money accounts subject to source and amount ($5000) limits rather than out of soft-money accounts that may receive unlimited donations. Through this mechanism, the regulations limit how much non-profits ultimately can spend on advertisements, get-out-the-vote efforts, and voter registration drives. These regulations therefore “reduce[] the