French CJ Hayne J Crennan J Kiefel J Bell J 18. possibility of undue or corrupt influence being exerted. However, it is the plaintiffs' submission that s 96D does nothing calculated to promote the achievement of those legitimate purposes. There is no purpose to the prohibition, other than its achievement. It is therefore simply a burden on the freedom without a justifying purpose. These submissions should be accepted. 52 The terms of s 96D do not reveal any purpose other than that political donations may not be accepted from persons who are not enrolled as electors, or from corporations or other entities. The context of the other provisions of Pt 6 does not illuminate the purpose of s 96D, rather they point up its absence of evident purpose and lack of connection to the scheme of Pt 6. 53 In contrast to the general, practical provisions for capping of political donations and electoral communication expenditure, s 96D is selective in its prohibition. Yet the basis for the selection was not identified and is not apparent. By contrast, the connection of the other provisions of Pt 6 to the general purposes of the EFED Act is evident. They seek to remove the need for, and the ability to make, large-scale donations to a party or candidate. It is large-scale donations which are most likely to effect influence, or be used to bring pressure to bear, upon a recipient. These provisions, together with the requirements of public scrutiny71, are obviously directed to the mischief of possible corruption. The same cannot be said of s 96D, in its wide-ranging prohibition on the sources of donations. 54 In argument, the identification by the defendant of a relevant purpose for the nature and scope of s 96D's prohibition proved elusive. The defendant pointed to the general purposes of the EFED Act, but was not able to explain how the prohibitions effected by s 96D were connected to them, let alone how the prohibitions could be said to further them. The defendant could point only to corporations as a justifiable target of s 96D. In its defence it pleads that, by reason of their character and size, corporations are more likely to represent a threat to integrity. It alleges that corporations are more likely to pursue selfinterest and that their boards are obliged to act in that way. Further, a corporation may do so in a manner inconsistent with the views of its members. 55 If the latter is a concern of the EFED Act, it in no way expresses or addresses it. It does not, for example, seek to regulate the making of donations by requiring the concurrence of shareholders. If corporations were in truth the 71 See above at [6].