Keane J 37. parties, candidates and third-party campaigners to engage in political communication and by discriminating between those sources. The plaintiffs noted that the facts agreed in the Special Case establish that the greater part of the donations to the major political parties in the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2011 were not from individuals. The plaintiffs also noted that the provisions for public funding pursuant to Pt 5 of the EFED Act were enacted prior to the introduction of the prohibition in s 96D and so cannot be seen as in some way "offsetting" the reduction in donations in consequence of s 96D. In any event, Pt 5 of the Act provides for only partial reimbursement of electoral communication expenditure. 118 The defendant submitted that s 96D imposes no effective burden on political communication, in that s 96D does not restrict any communication by the entities or persons that it prohibits from making political donations voicing support for, or opposition to, any party or candidate or any of their policies. 119 Ironically, the defendant's submission, echoing the plaintiffs' reliance on the First Amendment, replicates the confusion of a personal right of individual expression with the free flow of political communication within the federation. The question whether political communication is effectively burdened is not answered in the negative by the circumstance that an individual is permitted to "construct a particular communication" 105. The issue is as to the effect of the proscriptions upon the free flow of political communication within the federation. And whether the proscriptions burden that flow is not a complicated question. As to the first limb of the Lange test, in Monis 106 Hayne J said that: "[t]he expression 'effectively burden' means nothing more complicated than that the effect of the law is to prohibit, or put some limitation on, the making or the content of political communications." 120 Given that the evident purpose of s 96D is to limit the funds available to political campaigns, there is an air of unreality about the defendant's contention that s 96D does not burden political communication or that its effect is not substantial 107. Section 96D proscribes political donations by corporations, entities including industrial associations, and individuals other than enrolled electors. The facts agreed in the Special Case establish the importance of funding from corporations and industrial associations to campaigning. 105 APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 322 at 451 [381]. 106 (2013) 87 ALJR 340 at 367 [108]; 295 ALR 259 at 290. 107 Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181 at 200 [40]; [2004] HCA 41; Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506 at 555-556 [95].