The President should only find a nominee unacceptable for some good reason on objective grounds. If a President were permitted, capriciously or whimsically, without proffering a good reason, to reject eligible nominees, this would frustrate the proper working of the Constitution, defeat the intention behind the amendment to Article 161(2) and pave the way for unilateral presidential appointment. [28] Once the President and the Leader of the Opposition have hammered out a list of names not unacceptable to the President, the list, comprising the six persons, must then formally be submitted to the President by the Leader of the Opposition and the President must then select the Chairman from among those names. This approach gives the President a role in the identification of the six names, but it obviates the possibility that, after the formal presentation of the list, the President could suggest that one or more of the names, or indeed the entire list, is ‘unacceptable’. Unilateral appointment by the President in keeping with the proviso to Article 161(2) can hardly be an option if the Leader of the Opposition demonstrates a willingness to engage in good faith the process outlined above. [29] As we stated earlier, the President’s power to appoint the Elections Commission Chairman in keeping with Article 161(2) is a constitutionally prescribed responsibility that is subject to judicial scrutiny. In reviewing what transpired here between 22 November 2016 and 19 November 2017, it is evident to us that the President was not entitled to lay down, as a precondition to considering a nominee, eligibility requirements that were additional to or at variance with those prescribed by the Constitution. So, for example, it was unfortunate that the President considered or was advised that an acceptable candidate should either have or be deemed to have wide electoral knowledge and experience. As Counsel for Mr Mustapha pointed out, it is not unusual for a distinguished judge to have gone through her entire judicial career without trying a single elections case. [30] Nothing in this judgment is intended, in the slightest degree, to cast aspersions on the competence and suitability of Justice Patterson for the position of