14 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. “was rendered without full briefing or argument”). We are confronted with a different statute and different legal arguments, at a different point in the development of campaign finance regulation. Appellants’ substantial First Amendment challenge to the system of aggregate limits currently in place thus merits our plenary consideration.4 III The First Amendment “is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, . . . in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.” Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 24 (1971). As relevant here, the First Amendment safeguards an individual’s right to participate in the public debate through political expression and political association. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 15. When an individual contributes money to a candidate, he exercises both of those rights: The contribution “serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views” and “serves to affiliate a person with a candidate.” Id., at 21–22. Those First Amendment rights are important regardless whether the individual is, on the one hand, a “lone pamphleteer[ ] or street corner orator[ ] in the Tom Paine mold,” or is, on the other, someone who spends “substan—————— 4 The dissent contends that we should remand for development of an evidentiary record before answering the question with which we were presented. See post, at 28–30 (opinion of BREYER, J). But the parties have treated the question as a purely legal one, and the Government has insisted that the aggregate limits can be upheld under the existing record alone. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 43, 55–56. We take the case as it comes to us.