34 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. and spent only by their recipients. Such a solution would address the same circumvention possibilities as the current aggregate limits, while not completely barring contributions beyond the aggregate levels. In addition (or as an alternative), if Congress believes that circumvention is especially likely to occur through creation of a joint fundraising committee, it could require that funds received through those committees be spent by their recipients (or perhaps it could simply limit the size of joint fundraising committees). Such alternatives to the aggregate limits properly refocus the inquiry on the delinquent actor: the recipient of a contribution within the base limits, who then routes the money in a manner that undermines those limits. See Citizens United, supra, at 360–361; cf. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U. S. 514, 529–530 (2001). Indeed, Congress has adopted transfer restrictions, and the Court has upheld them, in the context of state party spending. See 2 U. S. C. §441i(b). So-called “Levin funds” are donations permissible under state law that may be spent on certain federal election activity—namely, voter registration and identification, get-out-the-vote efforts, or generic campaign activities. Levin funds are raised directly by the state or local party committee that ultimately spends them. §441i(b)(2)(B)(iv). That means that other party committees may not transfer Levin funds, solicit Levin funds on behalf of the particular state or local committee, or engage in joint fundraising of Levin funds. See McConnell, 540 U. S., at 171–173. McConnell upheld those transfer restrictions as “justifiable anticircumvention measures,” though it acknowledged that they posed some associational burdens. Id., at 171. Here, a narrow transfer restriction on contributions that could otherwise be recontributed in excess of the base limits could rely on a similar justification. Other alternatives might focus on earmarking. Many of the scenarios that the Government and the dissent hy-