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Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. exchange of an official act for money. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U. S. 257, 266 (1991). “The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.” Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 497 (1985). Campaign finance restrictions that pursue other objectives, we have explained, impermissibly inject the Government “into the debate over who should govern.” Bennett, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 25). And those who govern should be the last people to help decide who should govern. The statute at issue in this case imposes two types of limits on campaign contributions. The first, called base limits, restricts how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee. 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(1). The second, called aggregate limits, restricts how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees. §441a(a)(3). This case does not involve any challenge to the base limits, which we have previously upheld as serving the permissible objective of combatting corruption. The Government contends that the aggregate limits also serve that objective, by preventing circumvention of the base limits. We conclude, however, that the aggregate limits do little, if anything, to address that concern, while seriously restricting participation in the democratic process. The aggregate limits are therefore invalid under the First Amendment. I A For the 2013–2014 election cycle, the base limits in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), permit an individual to contribute up to $2,600 per election to a candidate ($5,200 total for the primary

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McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether the Federal Election Campaign Act's (FECA) aggregate contribution limits — which cap the total amount an individual may contribute to all federal candidates and political committees combined in a two-year election cycle — violated the First Amendment by restricting political speech and association beyond what was necessary to prevent quid pro quo corruption. The specific question was whether the aggregate limits were "closely drawn" to the government's anti-circumvention interest, or whether they constituted an unconstitutional "outright ban" on further contributions to additional candidates and committees — particularly given that the base limits already prevented any single donor from giving more than the statutory maximum to any individual candidate or committee.

Alleged Acts: Shaun McCutcheon, an Alabama businessman and conservative activist, wanted to contribute $2,600 each to 16 different Republican congressional candidates in the 2012 election cycle — a total of $41,600, which was within the base limits for each individual candidate but would have exceeded the $48,600 aggregate limit on contributions to candidates. The Republican National Committee (RNC) joined as a co-plaintiff, challenging the aggregate limits as an unconstitutional restriction on political speech and association under the First Amendment.

Procedural history: A three-judge district court panel rejected the challenge and upheld the aggregate limits, finding that they served the government's interest in preventing circumvention of the base contribution limits.

Summary: McCutcheon v. FEC is a landmark campaign finance decision in which the Supreme Court struck down FECA's aggregate contribution limits — the caps on the total amount an individual could contribute to all federal candidates and political committees combined in a two-year election cycle. In a 5–4 decision, the plurality opinion by Chief Justice Roberts held that the aggregate limits violated the First Amendment because they constituted an "outright ban" on further contributions to additional candidates and committees, and were not "closely drawn" to the government's interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. The plurality reaffirmed that the only permissible government interest in campaign finance regulation is preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance — explicitly rejecting "undue influence," "ingratiation," "access," and "general gratitude" as insufficient justifications. Crucially, the plurality held that the aggregate limits were unnecessary to prevent circumvention of the base limits because existing earmarking rules, disclosure requirements, and base contribution limits already served as sufficient prophylactic measures. The decision adopted the "prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis" framework — requiring particularly rigorous scrutiny when a regulation adds yet another layer of restrictions on top of existing anti-corruption measures — and emphasized that speculation alone cannot justify speech restrictions, looking to the experience of the States for evidence of actual corruption risks. McCutcheon left the base limits undisturbed but laid the doctrinal groundwork for subsequent challenges to campaign finance restrictions, including FEC v. Cruz (2022) and NRSC v. FEC (2026), which both relied on McCutcheon's articulation of the rigorous "closely drawn" standard, its narrow definition of permissible anti-corruption interests, its earmarking and disclosure analysis, and its methodology of looking to the States for evidence of corruption.

Conclusion: In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that FECA's aggregate contribution limits violate the First Amendment. The plurality reaffirmed and narrowed the definition of the permissible government interest in campaign finance regulation. The plurality squarely rejected "undue influence," "ingratiation," "access," and "general gratitude" as impermissible bases for restricting political contributions. The plurality emphasized that even under the "closely drawn" test — the less demanding standard applicable to contribution limits — judicial review must be "rigorous." A regulation may not be "disproportionate" and must be "necessary" and "narrowly tailored" to the government's asserted interest. The plurality held that the aggregate limits constituted an "outright ban" on further contributions to additional candidates and committees, rather than a mere "contribution limit." The plurality explained that the aggregate limits "deny the individual all ability to exercise his expressive and associational rights by contributing to someone who will advocate for his policy preferences" once the cap is reached. The Government argued that without aggregate limits, a donor could make maximum contributions to numerous candidates and party committees, who could then funnel the money to a single candidate — thereby circumventing the base limits. The plurality rejected this argument, holding that the aggregate limits were not "closely drawn" to prevent circumvention. The plurality held that the Government's circumvention concerns were too speculative to justify the aggregate limits.

Legal Issue(s)

Campaign Finance

Applicable Law(s): Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and First Amendment of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Apr 2, 2014

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://www.fec.gov/resources/legal-resources/litigation/mccutcheon_sc_opinion.pdf

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McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission

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