IFES Practitioner Brief on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Elections For the purpose of preventing or resolving certain types of election disputes, EMBs appear to have focused on the use of conciliation 33 and mediation 34 rather than arbitration (although Namibia is a rare example of the latter). 35 Informal methods of resolution, including discussion and dialogue, 36 and referrals to non-formal authorities, such as respected members of the community, are also used to resolve electoral disputes in some countries. 37 It is important to distinguish these mechanisms from the complaints adjudication function of the EMB when it has a quasi-judicial role and has the mandate to make binding decisions as part of its mandate to ensure the integrity of elections. In such cases, these mechanisms will be referred to as formal or conventional EDR (or simply “EDR”), rather than ADR. It is generally a feature of ADR mechanisms that the parties have voluntarily agreed to enter into the process, whereas EDR does not require any opt-in process or agreement of the parties. Our research and interviews with interlocutors found that mediation or conciliation in the electoral field are voluntary processes that the parties agree to participate in, although in other areas of law mediation can be mandated by a court. In general, it is rare for ADR processes to yield a binding outcome, although arbitration can do so, whereas mediation and conciliation tend to yield an agreed, consensual outcome. Regardless of the nature of the outcome, it is an important principle in the electoral context, given the fundamental rights at stake, that the right of redress to a court is maintained. 38 In practice, case studies show that the lines between ADR and EDR can be blurred. For example, in adjudicating complaints about voter or candidate eligibility, some EMBs include in the decision-making body representatives from political parties or persons from the community. This can result in confusion over the final adjudication authority. These blurred mandates appear to be more and more common due to the expansion of ADR mechanisms by EMBs without adequate rules, guidance, or training for election officials, mediators, or conciliators. In some countries, the broad or undefined mandate of these EDR and ADR committees can raise concerns over the quality and fairness of the adjudication, as stressed in the examples from Tanzania, Myanmar, and Ethiopia discussed later in this paper. While the line between ADR and EDR may sometimes be blurred, the element of consent, the non-binding nature of For example, in Cambodia, which employs Conciliation Committees through the National Election Commission. For example, District Ethics Committees in Tanzania, Election Mediation Committees in Myanmar, indigenous traditional justice mechanisms in the state of Oaxaca in Mexico, the Complaints Center in Sri Lanka, Conflict Management Committees in Zambia. 35 Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. (2005). EISA Election observer mission report Namibia – Presidential and national assembly elections 2004: EISA election observer mission report, No. 18, pp. 17-18. https://www.eisa.org/pdf/namomr04.pdf 36 For example, in El Salvador, the Attorney General’s Office provides trained mediators to provide information and facilitate discussion. 37 For example, committees of the wise in Niger, made up of traditional and religious leaders. See Committees of the wise in Niger’s general election (in French). (2020, December 6). Africa-Press. https://www.africa-press.net/niger/homepage-french/elections-generalesau-niger-le-comite-des-sages-appelle-toutes-les-parties-a-oeuvrer-pour-des-elections-apaisees 38 Orozco-Henríquez, J. (2010). Electoral justice: The International IDEA handbook. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/electoral-justice-handbook.pdf 33 34 19