IFES Practitioner Brief on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Elections The inspectors coordinate the prevention and resolution of all such conflicts, ensuring the appropriate bodies are tasked as necessary. The inspectors are trained in mediation, analysis and transformation of conflicts, and constructive communication techniques. They seek to resolve conflicts before they become formal complaints that go through the established EDR system (in which complaints are determined by different levels of the TSE), thus reducing the burden on the TSE. The multi-agency coordination has also been helpful in tackling impunity for electoral crimes, by ensuring that relevant cases are passed to the specialist electoral prosecutors quickly. Malawi This case study presents a positive example of targeted multi-actor coordination led by the EMB, which can help prevent conflict and fight impunity and has gained the trust of stakeholders. However, its informality can be a disadvantage in that it does not have a legal basis or clear rules but depends on ad hoc referrals, and the mechanism does not operate consistently across the country. Like a number of other African countries, Malawi has a culture of community-level ADR mechanisms rooted in its traditional institutions. This led to a formal requirement in Malawi’s Constitution to adopt and implement mechanisms for settling disputes through negotiation, good offices, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. 191 This commitment to ADR is reflected in the election context in the role of Multi-Party Liaison Committees (MPLCs). In 2000, the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC), which is mandated to address complaints of irregularities, established the MPLCs to promote dialogue to prevent and resolve election-related disputes at the district level. MPLCs are made up of local stakeholders, including representatives of political parties, local authorities and civil society, and traditional leaders.192 They address pre-election disputes, including conflicts over venues for rallies, alleged campaign violations, and conflicts between supporters of rival candidates. The MPLCs can be very effective at resolving disputes early, having succeeded in reducing the burden of pre-election disputes (mainly inter-party conflicts) for both the MEC and the courts. 193 Operating as a complementary mechanism to the conventional EDR process, MPLCs have helped improve the legitimacy and acceptance of elections by stakeholders through their ability to facilitate dialogue and build consensus. 194 In 2019, the EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) reported that stakeholders supported the MPLCs and “expressed satisfaction with their role in addressing localized concerns, minimizing risks of violence, and resolving disputes.” 195 Similarly, the African Union EOM in 2019 reported on the functioning of the MPLCs, especially Malawi Constitution ch. III, § 13(l); Kapanda, F. E. (2013). A critical evaluation of judicial mediation in Malawi. (Master’s thesis, University of Cape Town, South Africa). http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9167 192 In terms of political party membership of MPLC members, interlocutors emphasized the importance of ensuring diverse representation, not only the strongest parties in the area. This requires building the capacity of all party members and, indeed, all members. 193 Senior Malawi Election Commission official, personal communication, December 2021. 194 International donor community official, personal communication, December 2021. 195 European Union election observation mission final report: Malawi 2019 - Tripartite elections. (2019). https://www.eods.eu/library/EU%20EOM%20MWI%202019%20FR.pdf. Similarly, in the 2014 elections, the EU EOM reported that MPLCs were the preferred tool for conflict resolution in almost all districts, hampered in a few by lack of funding. European Union election observation mission final report: Malawi 2014 - Tripartite elections: presidential, parliamentary and local council. (2014). https://www.eods.eu/library/EUEOM%20FR%20MALAWI%2020-05-2014_en.pdf 191 71