IFES Practitioner Brief on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Elections counting process. Although referred to as “mediation,” this initiative goes beyond what is usually understood by that term. It includes providing accurate on-the-spot information to all stakeholders about voting and counting procedures. This can be enough to clear up misunderstandings and resolve minor issues, thereby averting conflict and reducing the burden of complaints that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) would otherwise need to deal with. This mechanism has also shown that the introduction of ADR can be initiated by other institutions (in this case the attorney general) and not necessarily the EMB. In an early OSCE/ODIHR research paper on EDR, Denis Petit noted that “challenging an election, its conduct or its results, should…not be perceived as a reflection of weakness in the system, but as proof of the strength, vitality, and openness of the political system.” 72 An important cultural aspect to consider with respect to EDR is the fear of tarnishing the EMB’s reputation if too many complaints are filed. This perception led the EMB in Myanmar to establish informal ADR mechanisms to resolve disputes ahead of the formal adjudication process before the court. The impact of the establishment of Election Mediation Committees in Myanmar in the 2015 elections had a positive outcome on the resolution of disputes during the pre-election period. 73 However, it should not be ignored that one of the practical objectives for an EMB introducing ADR in elections is also to reduce the number of disputes filed with the EMB or limit the backlog of cases presented before the courts. Nigeria has a long tradition of using ADR in other fields. Still, electoral stakeholders appeared reluctant to use ADR since the election commission (INEC) introduced it in 2008 to resolve electoral disputes. In 2011, the INEC established an AEDR Directorate composed of election officials. Despite continued efforts to promote the use of ADR to limit and triage the number of disputes, which overwhelmed the courts before and after the 2019 general elections, the ADR mechanism remains underutilized and under-funded. In parallel, some experts and academics are calling for reform to introduce ADR in the proceedings of the election court. IFES’s nationwide public opinion surveys indicated that 40 percent of respondents preferred the ability to engage in ADR over filing before the courts. 74 Based on the experience of previous elections, it is unlikely that Nigerian politicians will agree to voluntarily submit their disputes to a person or body outside the established judicial system and accept the resolution or settlement of their dispute as binding. 75 The case in Nigeria has highlighted the need to distinguish and adapt solutions for local versus federal issues, and the importance of funding for outreach about the use of ADR. The willingness to submit disputes to mediation or conciliation during an election may vary among states and may also vary depending on whether it is a federal or provincial election. Therefore, a failure of stakeholders to use ADR at the central level does not necessarily mean that stakeholders would not use it in a municipal race or a particular county or province. 72 Petit, D. (2000). Resolving election disputes in the OSCE area: Towards a standard election dispute monitoring system. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. https://eos.cartercenter.org/uploads/document_file/path/402/17567.pdf 73 EU EOM Myanmar general elections 2015 - Final report. (n.d.). https://www.eods.eu/library/myanmar_final_report_en.pdf 74 IFES Nigeria. (2021). Sustaining Electoral Reforms in Nigeria (2021–2026): Programming Options Paper. 75 Bello, A.A. & Aminu, R. (2009). Situating alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the political sphere: Thoughts on mechanisms for preelection political dispute resolution in Nigeria. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1369702 34