Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 11 Opinion of the Court historical practice. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Libertarian Party of Mississippi 14–28; post, at 6–12. They emphasize that in the mid-to-late 19th century—around the enactment of the first and second election-day statutes— ballot receipt occurred on election day. See Brief for Respondent Libertarian Party of Mississippi 18–19. And while one might dismiss this timing as a byproduct of inperson voting, plaintiffs insist that the advent of absentee voting proves otherwise. When some States authorized soldiers to vote by mail during the Civil War, ballot casting and ballot receipt were no longer simultaneous—so these States could have allowed a grace period for receipt.3 But none did.4 See id., at 25; Brief for Republican Respondents 27. Instead, plaintiffs contend, ballots traveling through the war-torn country were not counted unless they —————— 3 Most States that authorized absentee voting during the Civil War did not permit mail-in voting. See Collins 27. Instead, they erected polling places in the field, with military officers deputized to serve as election officials. See ibid. Under this system, called field voting, soldiers voted in person (though outside their home precincts), and ballot casting and ballot receipt remained simultaneous. So while the dissent lumps all soldier voting together, see post, at 6–7, the practice in most States does not shed light on whether States thought that mail-in ballots had to be received, rather than merely cast, by election day. 4 While we accept it for the sake of argument, plaintiffs’ account of this history is debatable. Two States tasked military officers, who were not deputized as election officials, with collecting soldiers’ ballots on election day and then sending the ballots to state election officials for counting— which meant that ballots were not received into official custody until after election day. 1866 Nev. Stats. p. 215; 1864 R. I. Acts & Resolves p. 4. Plaintiffs insist that these ballots were still “effectively received into official custody on Election Day” because military officers were tasked with “certify[ing] the legitimacy of the votes” before sending them. Brief for Respondent Libertarian Party of Mississippi 32. But it is not clear why collection and certification by military officers should be treated as “effectiv[e] recei[pt]” by the State. Ibid. And if “effectiv[e] recei[pt]” rather than actual receipt is the standard, then why doesn’t Mississippi’s law— which requires all ballots to be received by the Postal Service or common carrier by election day—pass muster?