4 WATSON v. REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE Syllabus at 72. Finally, plaintiffs’ policy arguments about election integrity and voter confidence are properly directed to legislatures, not courts, see, e.g., SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U. S. 357, 368, and regardless, plaintiffs’ definition of “election” would do little to address the concerns they identify. Pp. 9–21. (d) Plaintiffs argue that Mississippi’s election system violates the election-day statutes because the Postal Service and common carriers allow mail to be recalled before it is delivered to election officials, meaning that the electorate’s choice is not actually made as of election day. Even if plaintiffs are right about Mississippi law, they would still lose the challenge they have pressed in this litigation: that post-election-day ballot receipt is itself unlawful. Post-election-day receipt, considered on its own, does not conflict with the election-day statutes, and state law is preempted only “ ‘so far as the conflict extends,’ ” Foster, 522 U. S., at 69. Pp. 21–22. 120 F. 4th 200, reversed and remanded. BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., joined, and in which KAVANAUGH, J., joined as to all but Parts II–C–2 and III.