Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 15 Opinion of the Court retain the power to set ballot-receipt deadlines.8 Plaintiffs and their amicus, the United States, offer various ways to “reconcile” their interpretation of the election-day statutes with UOCAVA. Tr. of Oral Arg. 79–80. Their theories are unpersuasive. Plaintiffs and the United States cannot even agree among themselves on how this reconciliation should work. The United States argues that UOCAVA creates an exception to the ballot-receipt deadline set by the election-day statutes. In its view, States may count the absentee ballots of military and overseas voters even if they arrive after election day. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24. Plaintiffs cannot quite stomach that interpretation, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 79–80, 85; accord, post, at 15–16, and for good reason: UOCAVA is not worded like an exception. It does not authorize States to create ballot-receipt deadlines; rather, it presumes that States have that authority already. See, e.g., 52 U. S. C. §20303(b)(3) (federal absentee ballots “shall not be counted” if a State receives the voter’s state —————— 8 To escape the force of the related-statute canon—which all agree is the canon relevant here—the dissent mischaracterizes it. See post, at 14–16. The dissent selectively quotes from West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83, 100–101 (1991), to suggest that a laterenacted statute can inform the meaning of a related, earlier one only in extreme circumstances. Post, at 15–16. But a later enactment will “often change the meaning that would otherwise be given to an earlier provision that is ambiguous.” See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 330 (2012). When faced with such ambiguity, we interpret the earlier provision “to contain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law.” West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, 499 U. S., at 100. If the dissent thought that the term “election” unambiguously encompassed ballot receipt, it would not need to rely so heavily on historical practice. Thus, the dissent must ask what “permissible meaning” “most logically and comfortably” fits with UOCAVA. Ibid. The dissent resorts to misstating the related-statute canon only because the answer to that question is so obvious.