of the courts in the electoral processes cannot be dismissed. Despite this, states must consider other complementary systems for dispute resolution before the conventional court contest. During the coalition government in Zimbabwe between 2009 and 2013, the Global Political Agreement (GPA) created a meta-mediation mechanism called the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC), composed of various political parties that were party to the agreement. The mechanism was in a way an extra-judicial conflict transformation mechanism to help resolve disputes related to political violence before they reach the courts. It has been suggested that, ideally, the courts should mitigate against the risk of electoral violence by providing a dispute resolution mechanism through which aggrieved political contenders can seek redress.6 This should include alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms and mediation platforms that operate with the force of law. The advantages of ADR approaches as part of the judicial and quasi-judicial approach to conflict transformation are that they are less expensive, are judicially sanctioned and are more conciliatory in approach. This approach is relatively new, although various aspects of it have been implemented in different countries. In 2014, South Africa introduced CourtAnnexed Mediation as part of efforts to enhance access to justice. Principles like those used in these mediation methods can be used to design a comprehensive platform to ensure that in the pre-election environment there is a solid dispute management process. This was attempted in a different way by the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission in Zimbabwe ahead of the 2018 elections. The Commission established a multi-party dialogue platform, and political parties were required to sign a Code of Conduct. The problem with such platforms, however, is always the question of power balance and trust in the mechanism. A trusted and independent 6 7 8 judiciary can help guarantee the process and firewall the mechanisms against capture by the dominant actors. This, of course, requires that the judiciary, which provides the platform for such interventions, is trusted by the parties and has the credibility to ensure that decisions and agreements from the platforms can be enforced at law. However, if other parties have no faith in the judiciary, the whole process remains fragile. ENSURING POPULAR FREE PARTICIPATION The popular saying goes, “Democracy is not rule by the majority. Rather it is rule by the majority who vote.” This is true in many “so-called democracies,” where the question of who governs is answered by the minority. Millions of people may, for instance, for one reason or the other, not take part in elections. This happens not because of a single event, but a culture that is shaped by several factors over time. It can be a culture of fear, exclusion, or disempowerment. It takes root mainly from seemingly harmless decisions and choices made over time. In identifying the five major challenges to electoral integrity, the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security, says one of the challenges is removing barriers — legal, administrative, political, economic, and social — to universal and equal political participation.7 In Electoral Commission of South Africa v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others,8 the court spoke of the fundamental issue of participation: Behind the complexities of precedent and the intricate statutory machinery, lies a question of importance for every South African. How can this Court best ensure that the 2019 elections fulfil the promises the Bill of Rights makes about the franchise? These are, first, that every citizen is “free to make political choices,” and second, that every citizen “has the right to free, fair and regular elections.” SM Burchard & M Simati ‘The Role of the Courts in Mitigating Election Violence in Nigeria’ (2019) 38 Cadernos de Estudos Africanos [Online]. <https://journals.openedition.org/cea/ pdf/4407> pp123-144. Annan et al (n 1). Electoral Commission of South Africa v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2019 (3) BCLR 289 (CC). 51

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