INTRODUCTION Democratic elections that are free and fair have long been accepted as lying at the heart of democratic governance. It is through democratic elections that people rule themselves through their freely chosen representatives. For this reason, democratic elections lead to representative democracy. At the core of democratic elections is the expression of the will of the people. Whenever an election is conducted, it is imperative that electoral management authorities strive to ensure that the election result is an accurate representation of the will of those who voted. In other words, electoral management bodies (EMBs), within their mandate to organise and manage regular, free and fair elections, should guarantee the integrity of the electoral process from its onset until the declaration of the result. This explains why there is immense public interest in the preservation of the integrity of the electoral process and the declaration of the election result. Where there is evidence of breaching the integrity of the electoral process, such a scenario results in politically charged disagreements. Invariably, disputes involving the results of an election in Sub-Saharan Africa stand are determined by a court of law or tribunal, be it of general or specialised jurisdiction. IT IS THROUGH DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS THAT PEOPLE RULE THEMSELVES THROUGH THEIR FREELY CHOSEN REPRESENTATIVES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 84 Election petitions are believed to have originated in England in the House of Commons. This took the form of a parliamentary inquiry into the substance of an electoral complaint.1 The House of Commons was “the sole proper judge” of its members’ returns, “without which the freedom of the election were not entire.”2 The inquiry process was adversarial in nature and devoid of any legal technicalities. In 1604, the Commons Committee, as the “sole and proper judge” entrusted with inquiring into elections petitions, had this to say: We avouch that the House of Commons is the sole proper judge of return of all such writs and of the election of all such members as belong to it, without which the freedom of election were not entire: And that the Chancery, though a standing court under your Majesty, be to send out those writs and receive the returns and to preserve them, yet the same is done only for the use of the Parliament, over which neither the Chancery nor any other court ever had or ought to have any manner of jurisdiction.3 Around 1868, through the Parliamentary Elections Act,4 the jurisdiction to adjudicate proceedings was transferred to courts of law, with little changes in terms of procedure. This piece of legislation remains applicable in England to this day.5 The reasons for this development were many, chief of which was that “It later became apparent that partisanship was eroding the credibility of the House decisions on elections and the ultimate diminution of public confidence in elections as a whole.”6 The transition was dramatic. At first, the judiciary was averse to accepting jurisdiction over election petitions. The famous and widely quoted words of the Chief Justice to the Lord Chancellor on 6 February 1868 deserve direct quotation:7 C O’Leary ‘The Elimination of Corrupt Practices in British Elections’ 1868-1911 (1961) 4. Recently applied in the case of R (on the application of Philip James Woolas) and The Parliamentary Election Court [2010] EWHC 3169 (Admin). Woolas Judgment, para 23. Sometimes known as the Election Petitions and Corrupt Practices at Elections Act, 1868 or Corrupt Practices Act, 1868. Recently applied in the case of R (on the application of Philip James Woolas) and The Parliamentary Election Court [2010] EWHC 3169 (Admin). H ‘Nyane, ‘A Critique of Proceduralism in the Adjudication of Electoral Disputes in Lesotho’ (2018) Journal of African Elections 1 at p4. Woolas Judgment (n 124).

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