cannot exercise political rights through effectively participating as voters or candidates due to violence.30 Would it then be justifiable to impose the harshest of penalties? The Code does not, however, envision barring a candidate from participating in the ongoing election in the first instance.31 The IEBC barred an independent candidate, Neto Adhola, from contesting elections on account of failure to pay the fine imposed within 48 hours.32 The candidate had violated the Code by using the colours of a political party. A considerable section of the political class has abundant resources to spend, making monetary penalties ineffective. There are no available data on politicians’ 2017 campaign expenditure, save for the contribution and expenditure limits set by the IEBC in August 2016 under the Election Campaign Financing Act 2013. These limits resulted from research, experiences of Kenya, and consultations with stakeholders, among them elected leaders, on their 2013 expenditure. For instance, the expenditure limit for a Presidential candidate was set at Kenyan Shillings 5,247,588,207.74 (approximately $52,475,882), a County Ward Representative candidate in Fafi Ward (Garissa County) was set at Kenyan Shillings 68,884.07 (approximately $688, while in Imara Daima Ward (Nairobi County) the limit was set at Kenya Shillings 9,745,184.69 (approximately $97,451.84).33 The limits were never operationalised, but they offer insight into the finances of some individuals in the political class.34 A discussion on regulating campaign expenditure in elections is captured later in the chapter under the subject of campaign financing. It should be noted that a remedy is effective only when it is practical. An EDR body that makes orders deviating from this principle risks not only being a poor arbiter but also a contributor towards limiting the expression of popular will. Although it is a tough and memorable sanction to bar a political party or a candidate that breaches the 30 31 32 33 34 35 28 Code from contesting elections, this could have negative consequences. These may include the affected party or candidate instigating violence; in this case, EDR would have failed to prevent violence. The Code cannot be used as a tool to whip political parties into shape if they had been, before the election period, allowed not to comply with electoral law provisions. What would be the effect of barring a political party with a relatively huge base of members and supporters? Would the opposing political party have legitimacy if it wins such an election? What would be the effect of such a penalty on the voters who support the barred political party or candidate? Be that as it may, the law does not exist as a source of livelihood for the legislature, to keep Parliament busy, it must have force. In the same vein, EDR requires pragmatism; this is a strong argument for using intermediate sanctions before resorting to the harsh ones. Although there is a Code and Rules of Procedure, the ECCEC has sweeping discretion on what penalties to mete out. There is no guidance on which sanctions would apply to particular violations, resulting in a lack of clarity and certainty. Although the Second Schedule to the Elections Act under paragraph 7(2) provides guidance on when one could be barred from contesting elections, one of the questions is whether the gravity of an offence should warrant being barred from contesting elections. The nature and repercussions of such a penalty demands certainty in terms of the offences. The penalty should be applied, if merited. The requirement for ECCEC to comprise five members is strenuous for the IEBC and its performance, given the demands of an election period on an EMB. The composition of ECCEC is, however, linked to a time when the IEBC consisted of the Chairperson and eight other members, as opposed to the current composition of a Chairperson and six other members.35 The 2017 and 2018 developments that saw four Yolande B & Others ‘Women’s political inclusion in Kenya’s devolved political system, Journal of Eastern African Studies’(2019) https://www.researchgate.net/deref/ https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.1080%2F17531055.2019.1592294 (accessed 26 February 2021). Elections Act 24 of 2011 Second Schedule para 7(b). As above. See http://kenyalaw.org/kenya_gazette/gazette/volume/MTQwMg--/Vol.CXVIII-No.%2090/ (accessed 1 April 2020). The limits are meant to curb huge spending and provide an equal playing field. The Orange Democratic Movement while commenting on the limits termed them to be high, however, they were a ceiling. The political class has not publicly and genuinely provided clarity on their expenditure. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act 9 of 2011 sec 5.

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