Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
5
Syllabus
bound by state constitutional restraints when exercising authority under the Elections Clause. Two state constitutional provisions adopted
shortly after the founding expressly constrained state legislative action under the Elections Clause. See Del. Const., Art. VIII, §2 (1792);
Md. Const., Art. XIV (1810). In addition, multiple state constitutions
at the time of the founding regulated the “manner” of federal elections
by requiring that “elections shall be by ballot.” See, e.g., Ga. Const.,
Art. IV, §2. Moreover, the Articles of Confederation—from which the
Framers borrowed—provided that “delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature of each state shall direct.”
Art. V. Around the time the Articles were adopted, multiple States
regulated the appointment of delegates, suggesting that the Framers
did not understand that language to insulate state legislative action
from state constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Del. Const., Art. XI
(1776). Pp. 24–26.
3. Although the Elections Clause does not exempt state legislatures
from the ordinary constraints imposed by state law, federal courts
must not abandon their duty to exercise judicial review. This Court
has an obligation to ensure that state court interpretations of state law
do not evade federal law. For example, States “may not sidestep the
Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property interests.” Phillips
v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U. S. 156, 167. While the Court
does not adopt a test by which state court interpretations of state law
can be measured in cases implicating the Elections Clause, state
courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such
that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislatures
to regulate federal elections.
The Court need not decide whether the North Carolina Supreme
Court strayed beyond the limits derived from the Elections Clause, as
petitioners did not meaningfully present the issue in this Court. Pp.
26–29.
380 N. C. 317, 868 S. E. 2d 499, affirmed.
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SOKAGAN, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting
opinion in which GORSUCH, J., joined, and in which ALITO, J., joined as to
Part I.
TOMAYOR,