45 amparo (supra 91) and when it provided, in Article 61 of the Constitutional Court’s statute, that the Court should conduct its activities “punctually and without delays.” 94. This Court considers that, since the actions conducted before Congress in the procedure for the dismissal of the Constitutional Court justices were subject to legal provisions that should have been precisely observed, they may be the object of a legal action or recourse on due legal process. This control does not imply an evaluation of the acts of a strictly political nature that the Constitution attributes to the Legislature. 95. It is worth underlining that, when deciding on the applications for amparo filed by the dismissed justices, the Constitutional Court of Peru itself indicated that: The exercise of the power of sanction, specifically that of the dismissal of senior officials, cannot be openly evaluated in a jurisdictional seat, because it constitutes an act that is exclusive to the Congress of the Republic, equivalent to what, in doctrine, is called non-actionable political questions, [but] it is also true that this power is not unlimited or absolutely discretionary, but is subject to certain parameters, one of which, and perhaps the principal one, is that it should be exercised according to the principle of reasonableness, because it would not be logical or fair to decide to impose a measure of sanction following a situation of total uncertainty or lack of substantiation. Accordingly, in cases where an act of a political nature, such as the one questioned in this application for amparo, manifests an evident infringement of this principle and, by extension, others such as that of the democratic rule of law or due material process, it is an unobjectionable fact that this body can evaluate its coherence in the light of the Constitution. From the foregoing, it may be inferred that the Constitutional Court believed that it was possible to make a judicial review of acts connected to an impeachment proceeding in order to evaluate whether they had complied with the guarantees of due legal process. However, it also considered that, in this case, such guarantees had been respected and, consequently, the application for amparo was declared unfounded. 96. In view of the consequences of the instant case, the Court considers that the failure of the recourses filed against the decision of Congress that dismissed the Constitutional Court justices was due to an evaluation that was not strictly juridical. It has been proved that those who composed the Constitutional Court and heard the application for amparo of the dismissed justices were the same persons who took part or were involved in the impeachment proceeding in Congress. Consequently, according to this Court’s criteria and the requirements on the impartiality of the judge (supra 84 and 85), it can be said that the decision on the amparos in this case did not meet the requirements of the impartiality of the court that heard them. Therefore, the recourses filed by the alleged victims were not able to produce the result for which they had been envisaged and were condemned to failure. 97. In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the State violated the right to judicial protection embodied in Article 25 of the American Convention, with regard to Manuel Aguirre Roca, Guillermo Rey Terry and Delia Revoredo Marsano. XII