MADLANGA J Doctors for Life25 and UDM I26 principle calls for a harmonious reading of sections 18 and 19(3)(b). If the respondents’ reading of section 19(3)(b) does not, in fact, lead to a denial of the right to freedom of association, one cannot really speak of a conflict between sections 18 and 19(3)(b). The question is: does it lead to that denial? That question must be answered. An appearance of a denial cannot be enough; certainly not in the circumstances of this case, which involves complex issues of interpretation. Section 18 of the Constitution provides that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of association”. In its traditional sense this right is associated more with the positive than the negative element. The positive element is about the right of an individual to be free to form an association with whomsoever she or he wishes for whatever purpose. Of course, the purpose must be one that is worthy of protection under section 18. 27 The 25 Doctors for Life id. 26 UDM I above n 21. There is a debate between Woolman, on the one hand, and Haysom, on the other, on whether – from the onset – there is no question of the limitation of the right where the purpose of the association is criminality or to directly threaten the constitutional order. Woolman says there is not and that at the outset the association is unconstitutional. He makes his point in two works, Woolman “Freedom of association” in Woolman et al (eds) in Constitutional Law of South Africa Service 2 (2014) at 45-6 and Woolman “Association” in Currie and de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (Juta & Co, Cape Town 2018) at 401-2. He takes the view that the objects of these two types of associations justify their “categorical exclusion” from the protection of the right. And it is plain that this is not a conclusion the author reaches at the section 36(1) justification exercise because Woolman’s point is made under the title “Determining the Content of the Right” at 44-5 and under the title “Content of the Right” in Currie and de Waal at 397-401. What the author says in Currie and de Waal at 402 puts it beyond question that, according to him, the two instances are not protected from the onset. There he says: 27 “[W]e could reject a wholesale categorical exclusion for criminal associations. Under this last and least desirable option, we would then be faced with the choice of excluding criminal associations from the ambit of the freedom on an ad hoc basis or affording all criminal associations prima facie protection and then deciding whether restrictions on the association’s freedom are justified under the limitation clause.” Indeed, that the discussion headed “Limitations on the Right” in Woolman et al at 47-9 and in Currie and de Waal at 402 comes later puts it beyond question that Woolman’s view is that, right from the onset, these two instances do not receive even “prima facie protection” that may be subject to the justification exercise. So, the author says the proscription of associations that fall under these disputed categories does not limit the right at all. Article 9(2) of the German Basic Law makes express provision for the line adopted by Woolman. This article reads: “Associations whose aims or activities contravene the criminal laws or that are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding shall be prohibited.” 11