Cybersecurity in Elections: Developing a Holistic Exposure and Adaptation Testing (HEAT) Process for Election Management Bodies internet an unlimited number of times during advance polling. E-voters could also cast one paper ballot as their final vote, either in the advance period or on the day of the polls. The president of Estonia challenged the amendment in the Supreme Court, claiming that it gave e-voters an unfair advantage, violating the principle of uniformity in § 156(1) of the Estonian Constitution, interpreted as all having an equal possibility to affect the voting results. The president did not contest e-voting itself, only the ability for anyone e-voting to change his or her vote.73 The amendment was ruled constitutional and in line with the Council of Europe standards of e-voting. Estonia uses a mandatory ID card to verify identity in e-voting, so no legal obstacles were created. Voters already used different means to vote, such as postal voting, and did so in different situations, meaning voting was already not strictly uniform. The principle of one vote per voter was guaranteed by an electronic version of the double-envelope system used in advanced voting: voters approve their evotes by digital signature, pairing personal data with the encrypted vote. The two were not separated until after polls closed on Election Day, ensuring that no voter could vote twice. Voters’ information could not be transferred together into the computer that did the counting, guaranteeing secrecy. Each subsequent vote replaced the last, preventing voters from using multiple channels to cast multiple votes. The court noted that a possible violation of the right to equality is only unconstitutional if it is disproportionate to the “weight of the aims pursued.”74 The aims of increasing participation in elections and modernizing voting practices were considered legitimate (although it is worth mentioning that the amendment did not actually increase turnout, and that comparative studies generally have shown that the use of technology tends not to influence turnout).75 Further, the court found that using e-voting without allowing voters to change their vote may open this process up to possible intimidation, as internet voting is used in an uncontrolled environment, unlike the controlled environment of a polling station, where it is difficult to guarantee secrecy and freedom from intimidation. The Austrian Constitutional Court ruled on remote e-voting following the 2008 Austrian Student Association elections, in which e-voting was introduced for the first time. Two political parties in the election brought complaints against the election and the regulations governing it. The court did not 73 Constitutional judgement 3-4-1-13-05 (Supreme Court of Estonia). Ibid. 75 See, e.g., Kristjan Vassil and Till Weber, “A Bottleneck Model of E-Voting: Why Technology Fails to Boost Turnout,” New Media & Society 13, no. 8 (2011), 1336-1354; Karel Sál, “Remote Internet Voting and Increase of Voter Turnout: Happy Coincidence or Fact? The Case of Estonia,” Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology 9, no. 2 (September 30, 2015): 15-32; Harald Baldersheim, Jo Saglie, and Signe Bock Segaard, “Internet Voting in Norway 2011: Democratic and Organisational Experiences,” Oslo: Insitute for Social Research (2013), 1014; and Gary H. Roseman Jr. and E. Frank Stephenson, “The Effect of Voting Technology on Voter Turnout: Do Computers Scare the Elderly?”, Public Choice 123, no. 1 (2005): 39-47. New e-voters tend not to be new voters, but instead the technologically savvy portion of the existent traditional voter pool. A study on turnout in Estonia from 2005 (when the law was passed) to 2015 found a small increase in turnout following the introduction of e-voting, but not a causal connection. Mihkel Solvak and Kristjan Vassil, E-voting in Estonia: Technological Diffusion and Other Developments Over Ten Years (Tartu, Estonia: Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, 2016), 11-12, 169. 74 17