Cybersecurity in Elections: Developing a Holistic Exposure and Adaptation Testing (HEAT) Process for Election Management Bodies There are also broader principles that should be enshrined in law to avoid political exposure for the EMB in terms of cybersecurity. For example, if the election law does not clearly establish the independence of the central EMB and grant the EMB full control over their secretariat, the government, or certain quarters within it, may be tempted to install its own personnel in key IT positions. Since the issue of cybersecurity is often considered a matter of national security, there may be situations where the articles governing national security and EMB independence contradict each other. In terms of accountability, laws often establish shared responsibility for managing information assets, most importantly for voter registration data. In countries with passive registration systems, EMBs often depend on local and state authorities for voters’ citizenship and residency information. Even though the central election commission may be responsible for the accuracy of voter lists, it cannot fully control the process. The shared responsibility must be managed properly in the law or run the risk that no one is held accountable. In terms of data privacy, the authorities need to make sure that election legislation is harmonized with data protection legislation or includes articles about the protection of private citizen information, drawing on international principles. Similarly, important transparency measures should be enshrined in law, but without being overly prescriptive, and in a way that is supported by time and resources (for example, adequate provision in the EMB budget). At the time of writing, the opposition party in Zimbabwe has filed a petition in the Supreme Court seeking to nullify the election result, with one of the grounds being that the EMB did not release the entire final voter roll on a USB, as the EMB decided not to include photographs and biometric fingerprints. An EMB might consider their primary role to be managing elections without irregularities, even at the expense of transparency. As a result, they may forbid observers from coming too close to data-entry personnel who tabulate election results, whether for the sake of physical security or a calmer working environment. Even when an EMB wishes to be more transparent, they may value control over transparency to be safe. If the law establishes that transparency of information is one of an EMB’s core functions, the EMB will be required to strike a balance and allow closer access to observers. There are significant associated costs in ensuring transparency, especially in terms of information management. For example, if an EMB wants to be transparent about gender-disaggregated polling data, they need to be able to count and record this information at the polling station level and to publish the relevant data. This may be more difficult than it seems: some polling officials may fail to record gender information, or there may be technical challenges in the disaggregation process. An EMB that is legally required to disseminate this information must have the resources to properly design data-collection methodologies, train staff, securely store data, and publish information in an accessible format. Pakistan has recently included the requirement for gender-disaggregated data in its new election rules.97 97 Democracy Reporting International, “From Law to Action: Election Reforms in Pakistan,” 2018, https://democracy-reporting.org/from-law-to-action-election-reforms-in-pakistan/. 25