8.4(c) (see Office Of Disciplinary Counsel v Anonymous Attorney A., 552 Pa 223, 230, 714 A2d 402, 406 [1998] [listing sister states requiring a culpable mental state for violation of rule 8.4(c)]; see also Attorney Grievance Commn. of Maryland v Dore, 433 Md 685, 698, 73 A3d 161, 169 [2013][holding that violation of rule 8.4(c) requires a knowingly dishonest statement]). We, therefore, hold that in order to find a violation of RPC 8.4(c), the AGC is required to satisfy a knowing standard. Knowingness is expressly defined in the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.0(k) provides that “[k]nowingly,” “known,” “know” or “knows” “denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.” Thus, the element of knowingness must be considered in connection with each particular claim of misconduct. On this motion, whenever the AGC has sustained its burden of proving that respondent made knowing false and misleading factual statements to support his claim that the presidential election was stolen from his client, respondent must then demonstrate that there is some legitimate dispute about whether the statement is false or whether the statement was made by him without knowledge it was false. Conclusory or vague arguments will not create a controverted issue as to whether there has been misconduct. Consequently, once the AGC has established its prima facie case, respondent’s references to affidavits he has not provided, or sources of information he has not disclosed or other nebulous unspecified information, will not prevent the Court from concluding that misconduct has occurred.4 Respondent cannot create a 4 In opposition to this motion, respondent refers to affidavits he has not provided (Giuliani affidavit ¶¶11, 50, 61, 62, 66). He also relies on a “confidential informant” (Giuliani affidavit ¶82). We do not understand, nor does respondent explain why, as a 8