15 than twenty five thousand dollars; and c) resident in the Republic ten years prior to his election, provided that the President and the Vice President shall not come from the same County.” Lib. Const. Art. 52 (1986). By the same token, the fact that a person is selected to seek a certain office at a particular time cannot be interpreted to mean, as the appellee impresses upon this Court, that the person has all along been desirous of seeking the public office to which he or she has been selected to contest. It is true that in some instances, the person may out rightly express the desire to contest for the office or the desire may be inferred from the fact that the person failed to rebut or reject political advocacies being made in his or her name by “friends” for a particular elective office. But the mere fact that a person is nominated at a particular time to seek an elective public office cannot be a basis for the National Elections Commission interpretation that the person may have harbored or desired the intention to seek such office two or three years prior to the event. We do not believe that the Legislature intended to subscribe either of such intentions or desire to the law. We do not herein concern ourselves with the wisdom of the Act. Indeed, as we clearly stated in the Polson-Mappy case we are not clothed with the authority to determine whether the Legislature acted wisely or not in passing the Act. What we determined was that the Act is constitutional and that it barred certain members of the Executive Branch named in the Constitution and holding presidential appointments from engaging in political activities and contesting elective public offices while still retaining those positions. We do not believe that the use of the word desire detracted from that legislative intent. As the Polson Opinion stated, the wording of the sections, given the intent of the Act, suffered from a language deficit. But that defect in the language of the sections does not, in and of itself, alter the intent of the framers of the law who passed the Act and whose intent was manifest both within the Chambers of the Legislature and over and within the public media, even if the intent is considered, as stated by the appellants, to be absurd. Thus, as much as views may differ as to the wisdom of the specific sections, and their implications for the nation, we believe that the intention of the section was as concluded by the Chairman of