10 individual, like a vice presidential candidate who cannot legally desire to seek public elective office on his/her own, but must be selected by another, like a presidential candidate.” And to further exacerbate the errors already made, including the appellants filing of a bill of exceptions as if the decision was of the Board of Commissioners, the bill of exceptions was signed or approved only by the Chairman of the Commission rather than by a majority of the membership of the Board of Commissioners as has been done in numerous appeals taken from the decision of the Board of Commissioners. This action was a further indication that the decision was not of the Board but solely of the Chairman of the Elections Commission in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission. We shall revert to these core concerns later in this Opinion, following disposition of the issue raised by the appellants. Regarding the lone issue raised by the appellants in their bill of exceptions and in their brief, this is how they have structured same: “Whether Section 5.2 of the Code was intended to apply to an individual, like a vice presidential candidate who cannot legally desire to seek public elective office on his/her own, but must be selected by another, like a presidential candidate?” In attempting to provide an answer to the issue favourable to them the appellants took resort to this Court’s decision in the Selena MappyPolson v. Republic of Liberia case, decided by this Court on March 3, 2017, wherein this Court upheld the constitutionality of sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Code of Conduct, which had been challenged by the petitioner. They proclaim that in the Polson case, this Court laid down four salient points: (i) That “the purpose and objective of Section 5.2 of the Code is to ensure that presidential appointees are not allowed an advantage over others in the process of competing for elected positions by using their offices and Government resources in support of partisan activities; (ii) It is a rule of construction that statutes must be interpreted to best carry out their statutory purposes; (iii) It is also a rule, that courts must follow a presumption that the legislature intends reasonable results; and (iv) The courts are to follow the plain meaning of the statutory text, except when the text suggests an absurd result.” Using those points as the standard for the interpretation of sections 5.1 and 5.2, as applied to Co-appellant Harrison S. Karnwea, Sr., the appellants