13 wisdom of the Legislature that these officials tend to acquire obvious undue advantage over other candidates which most likely than not, is employed for personal electoral leads. To accept the exhaustive sanction theory proposed by Petitioner Polson-Mappy is to render the Code of Conduct Act meaningless and ineffectual." The clear intent, the appellee therefore concludes “is that officials of government appointed by the President shall not engage in political activities.” With specific reference to the status of Co-appellant Harrison S. Karnwea, Sr., the appellee states: “Co-appellant Karnwea engaged in political activities while serving as Managing Director of the FDA. The inference is that Co-appellant Karnwea used Government facilities, equipment and/or resources in support of partisan or political activities, prior to his resignation publicly from the Unity Party and joining the Liberty Party. This has given him an "obvious undue advantage over other candidates" which he intends to employ for personal electoral lead. Co-Appellant Karnwea should not be rewarded for this egregious violation of the Code of Conduct by allowing him to contest.” We are not persuaded by the arguments made by either side on the issue of the intent of the statute, especially in regard to the meaning to be given the word “desire”, as used in the Code. We note that although the appellants seek to place on it a definition which impresses upon the Court that the desire of Co-appellant Karnwea could only have been manifested by an open declaration which they say occurred when Co-appellant Karnwea was asked by Counsellor Charles Walker Brumskine to be his vice presidential running mate, we believe that the definition ascribed to the term and the application made of the definition to the events as they unfolded fail to take into consideration that the term is subjective rather than objective. It fails to take into account that a person may have the desire to seek a particular public office but may not outwardly show the desire; that he may harbor such desire and work towards it but do so in secret. The fact that the person desiring a particular office refrains from openly expressing the desire and chooses instead to work in secret to achieve the goal does not mean that the person does not harbor a desire for a particular office. In this particular case, the Court cannot speculate that Co-appellant Karnwea did not secretly