Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 THOMAS, J., concurring in part SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 22–807 _________________ THOMAS C. ALEXANDER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP, ET AL. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA [May 23, 2024] JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part. I join all but Part III–C of the Court’s opinion. The Court correctly concludes that the judgment below must be reversed under our precedents. Although I find the analysis in Part III–C persuasive, clear-error review is not an invitation for the Court to “sift through volumes of facts” and “argue its interpretation of those facts.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U. S. 234, 262 (2001) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). The Court’s searching review of the expert reports exceeds the proper scope of clear-error review. But, that analysis is not necessary to resolve the case. In Part III–B, the Court explains that the District Court failed to evaluate evidence reflecting the correlation between race and politics with the necessary presumption of legislative good faith. Ante, at 14–18. And, in Part III–D, it explains that the District Court failed to properly account for the plaintiffs’ failure to produce an alternative map. Ante, at 28–29. Both of those mistakes are reversible legal errors. I write separately to address whether our voting-rights precedents are faithful to the Constitution. This case is unique because it presents solely constitutional questions. The plaintiffs do not rely on the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for any of their claims. Nor do the South Carolina officials

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