6
ALEXANDER v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE
OF THE NAACP
THOMAS, J., concurring in part
Court identifies “the legislature’s partisan interests” as a
traditional criterion. Ante, at 19. Even considerations such
as a district’s “consistently urban character,” “common media sources,” and inclusion of “major transportation lines
. . . implicate traditional districting principles.” Bush v.
Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 966 (1996) (plurality opinion). We have
readily acknowledged that “[t]raditional redistricting principles . . . are numerous and malleable,” and that “some . . .
are surprisingly ethereal and admit of degrees.” BethuneHill, 580 U. S., at 190 (alteration and internal quotation
marks omitted).
To evaluate whether a map aligns with traditional districting principles, a court must “rank the relative importance of those . . . criteria.” Rucho, 588 U. S., at 708.
Without such a ranking, it is impossible to say what kinds
of maps the principles should yield. But, that analysis ensnarls courts in a political thicket. Traditional districting
principles often conflict with one another, and there is no
principled way for judges to resolve those conflicts. Consider the question whether the principles of contiguity and
compactness can justify a map that retains a relatively
small part of the old district’s core. See ante, at 19, 21. Or,
consider whether the principle of keeping communities of
interest together can justify uniting one community at the
cost of splitting another between several districts, or healing partially an existing split at the cost of introducing a
new one. See Allen v. Milligan, 599 U. S. 1, 57, 61 (2023)
(THOMAS, J., dissenting). These questions do not ask for
legal answers, only political compromises. Judicial resolution of racial gerrymandering claims thus requires precisely
the kind of “inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc” decisionmaking that we have said is beyond the judicial power.
Vieth, 541 U. S., at 278.
Evaluating compliance with traditional districting principles is further complicated by the fact that many decisions
are equally consistent with both a good-faith application of