20
ALEXANDER v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE
OF THE NAACP
THOMAS, J., concurring in part
intrusive potential of judicial intervention into the legislative realm.” Id., at 916. These concerns about intruding on
the political process should have been a clear sign to retreat. Instead, the Court forged ahead to adopt a constitutionally suspect compromise.
The racial predominance standard does not even purport
to be consistent with the colorblind Constitution. The Miller Court simply borrowed that standard from the District
Court’s flawed opinion below. The Court endorsed the District Court’s decision “to require strict scrutiny whenever
race is the ‘overriding, predominant force’ in the redistricting process.” Id., at 909, 917 (quoting Johnson v. Miller,
864 F. Supp. 1354, 1372 (SD Ga. 1994)). But, the District
Court’s opinion could not have been a stronger rejection of
our colorblind Constitution. It acknowledged that the racial predominance standard allowed legislatures to “intentionally consider race in redistricting—and even alter the
occasional line in keeping with that consideration—without
incurring constitutional review.” Id., at 1373. But, the District Court reasoned, “[b]oth the Supreme Court and Congress have already admitted that the Constitution is not
genuinely ‘color-blind.’ ” Id., at 1374. This provenance underscores the inconsistency of the racial predominance
standard with our colorblind Constitution.
Any use of race in drawing political districts—no matter
how minor—must be justified by a compelling interest. The
Court’s insistence on hearing nonjusticiable districting
claims leads it to disregard that principle in favor of a distorted standard that legitimizes racial classifications. If the
Court is truly concerned about intruding on the political
process, it should acknowledge that districting is a political
question and vacate the field.
B
The Court’s standard for vote dilution claims is similarly