28 ALEXANDER v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP THOMAS, J., concurring in part district does not require the drawing of the district,” but the court pointed to our decision in Allen to reject that contention. 86 F. 4th, at 599. Louisiana then held a special legislative session and adopted a new map that “established a second majority-Black congressional district to resolve the [Voting Rights Act] litigation.” Callais, v. Landry, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2024 WL 1903930, *1 (WD La., Apr. 30, 2024). The result? A different group of voters brought constitutional gerrymandering and vote-dilution claims against the State. Id., at *6–*7. That suit was also successful. A District Court found that race predominated in Louisiana’s process of adding the second majority-minority district, and enjoined the use of the new map. Id., at *17, *24. After the State argued that the proximity of the District Court’s order to important election deadlines would cause “election chaos,” Emergency Application in No. 23A1002, p. 19, we stayed the order, Order in No. 23A1002, 601 U. S. ___ (2024) (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006) (per curiam)). As these cases make clear, this Court’s jurisprudence puts States in a lose-lose situation. Taken together, our precedents stand for the rule that States must consider race just enough in drawing districts. And, what “just enough” means depends on a federal court’s answers to judicially unanswerable questions about the proper way to apply the State’s traditional districting principles, or about the groupwide preferences of racial minorities in the State. There is no density of minority voters that this Court’s jurisprudence cannot turn into a constitutional controversy. We have extracted years of litigation from every districting cycle, with little to show for it. The Court’s involvement in congressional districting is unjustified and counterproductive. * * * “When, under our direction, federal courts are engaged in

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