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REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
Per Curiam
Court allow ballots mailed and postmarked after election
day, April 7, to be counted. That is a critical point in the
case. Nonetheless, five days before the scheduled election,
the District Court unilaterally ordered that absentee ballots mailed and postmarked after election day, April 7, still
be counted so long as they are received by April 13. Extending the date by which ballots may be cast by voters—not
just received by the municipal clerks but cast by voters—
for an additional six days after the scheduled election day
fundamentally alters the nature of the election. And again,
the plaintiffs themselves did not even ask for that relief in
their preliminary injunction motions. Our point is not that
the argument is necessarily forfeited, but is that the plaintiffs themselves did not see the need to ask for such relief.
By changing the election rules so close to the election date
and by affording relief that the plaintiffs themselves did not
ask for in their preliminary injunction motions, the District
Court contravened this Court’s precedents and erred by ordering such relief. This Court has repeatedly emphasized
that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the
election rules on the eve of an election. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006) (per curiam); Frank v. Walker, 574
U. S. 929 (2014); Veasey v. Perry, 574 U. S. __ (2014).
The unusual nature of the District Court’s order allowing
ballots to be mailed and postmarked after election day is
perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that the District
Court had to issue a subsequent order enjoining the public
release of any election results for six days after election day.
In doing so, the District Court in essence enjoined nonparties to this lawsuit. It is highly questionable, moreover,
that this attempt to suppress disclosure of the election results for six days after election day would work. And if any
information were released during that time, that would
gravely affect the integrity of the election process. The District Court’s order suppressing disclosure of election results
showcases the unusual nature of the District Court’s order