10 may have already been so great, namely the numbers of votes destroyed but nevertheless the Judge in the case refused the application and said that the onus of proving that there had not been a free election had not been discharged because certain information had not been presented. But by saying that all the information so needed would be available after the counting of votes suggested therefore that that it is not till after the counting that you can present all the evidence required. And of course at that stage you are in the area of the Petition under s 206." As we have indicated before, this is the correct conclusion of law where legitimate grounds for invalidating an election are raised during the election process. However, in respect of polling schedules, s 117 is significant. It clearly states that whether or not there is a failure to observe a polling schedule or non compliance with s 114 of the Organic Law or variation or departure from a polling schedule, any such failure can never be a ground for invalidating an election. Whilst we agree that this provision is to be read within the context of an election petition, this provision does not give the National Court any jurisdiction to extend polling period before the result of an election is returned. This power as we have already pointed out is given to the Electoral Commission under the Organic Law. The question is whether, any other provision of the law gives the National Court power to extend a polling period? The Respondent relies on s 155 (4) of the Constitution. He submits that his application seeks to enforce constitutional rights of people to vote as guaranteed by s 50 (1) of the Constitution and they may enforce them under s 155 (4) of the Constitution. We understand that the Respondent relies on the last part of the provision which provides: "…and such other orders as are necessary to do justice in the circumstances of a particular case" For this proposition he relies on Application by Imoning [1992] PNGLR 119 and Supreme Court decision in the same matter see [1992] PNGLR 122. We find that this case does not deal with s 155 (4). This was an application made under s 57 (1) of the Constitution. The case was not related to extension of polling period. The case involved the effect of the death of a candidate on the right to vote. The issue was whether the amendment to s 96 (2) of the then Organic Law on the National Elections was inconsistent with the right to vote under s 50 of the Constitution? The matter went on review to the Supreme Court under s 155 (2) (b) of the Constitution. The case has nothing to do with s 155 (4) or with extension of polling schedule. It does not support the proposition relied upon by the Respondent. Woods J made reference to s 155 (4) in Negints v The Electoral Commission (supra). We referred to this passage earlier. We set it out again in the present context: "The Electoral Commissioner therefore has fairly wide powers for dealing with problems. This is an area of Executive Government and Administration. The National Court of course has wide powers to make such orders as a re deemed necessary see s. 155 (4) of the Constitution but that does not mean that it should exercise such powers too freely. The Electoral Commissioner is the expert in the running of elections, he is the person with responsibility to ensure elections are run properly, a Court should be very careful before it steps in to overrule the discretion