-9- Nos. 56 & 58 the departmental split between the First and Third Departments occurred simply because of the Third Department’s misreading of the statute governing timeliness of service. Moreover, the existence of even a genuine departmental split does not always result in our acceptance of the first case that might allow us to resolve the split. In any event, the departmental split here involves the interpretation of what constitutes “substantial compliance” under the unique circumstances of this pandemic and the particular facts of these cases. The nature and scale of the current emergency and responses to it, including stay-home and quarantine directives, has not been seen for a hundred years and is unlikely to re-appear in our lifetimes. The immensely unlikely recurrence of such circumstances peaking during an election petitioning period renders these cases not leaveworthy. Thus, the better course here would have been to rescind our grant of leave as improvident (see e.g. Piccircillo v State of New York, 91 S Ct 520 [1971]). There is no pressing need to correct the “errors” of the Appellate Division and, by doing so, remove from voters the ability to cast votes for candidates of their choosing in as fair an election as can be constituted under the present, immensely challenging circumstances. Because the First Department, recognizing the unique confluence of the pandemic, the governmental responses to it, and the pendency of the election, explicitly cabined its decision to those circumstances and the omissions at issue here, its decision has no consequences for the Election Law in ordinary circumstances – indeed, it had no consequences except as to this particular ballot. The unfortunate result of retaining these cases is the announcement of a never-again-to-be-cited rule: a candidate may either follow -9-