A. Voters 1. Injury in Fact Individual Plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated that they suffered an injury-in-fact. “[A] person’s right to vote is ‘individual and personal in nature.’”52 Accordingly, the denial of a person’s right to vote is typically always sufficiently concrete and particularized to establish a cognizable injury.53 This is true regardless of whether such a harm is widely shared.54 So long as an injury is concrete, courts will find that an injury in fact exists despite the fact that such harm is felt by many.55 This is precisely the situation presented here. Individual Plaintiffs have adequately pled that their votes were denied. As discussed above, the denial of a vote is a highly personal and concrete injury. That Individual Plaintiffs had their ballots cancelled and thus invalidated is sufficiently personal to establish an injury in fact. It is of no matter that many persons across the state might also have had their votes invalidated due to their county’s failure to implement a curing 52 53 54 55 Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964)). See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 349 (1960) (Whittaker, J.) (noting the distinction between injuries caused by outright denial of the right to vote versus those caused by reducing the weight or power of an individual’s vote). The Court notes that much of standing doctrine as it relates to voting rights arises from gerrymandering or vote-dilution cases, which often involve relatively abstract harms. See, e.g., Gill, 138 S. Ct.; Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). See Federal Elections Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (citing Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989)). See id. (“[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the [United States Supreme] Court has found ‘injury in fact.’”) (quoting Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449-50). - 15 -