Pointing to a case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Drake v. Obama,67 the Trump Campaign claims this theory proves injury-in-fact. First, the Court finds it important to emphasize that the term “competitive standing” has specific meaning in this context. Second, the Trump Campaign’s reliance on the theory of competitive standing under Drake v. Obama is, at best, misguided. Subsequent case law from the Ninth Circuit has explained that competitive standing “is the notion that ‘a candidate or his political party has standing to challenge the inclusion of an allegedly ineligible rival on the ballot, on the theory that doing so hurts the candidate’s or party’s own chances of prevailing in the election.’”68 In the present matter, there is no allegation that the Democratic Party’s candidate for President, or any other candidate, was ineligible to appear on the ballot. Examination of the other case law cited to by Plaintiffs contradicts their theory that competitive standing is applicable here for the same reason. For example, in Texas Democratic Party v. Benkiser, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found competitive standing in a case in which the Democratic Party petitioned against the decision to deem a candidate ineligible and 67 68 664 F.3d. Townley v. Miller, 722 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added) (quoting Drake, 664 F.3d at 782); see also Mecinas v. Hobbs, No. CV-19-05547, 2020 WL 3472552, at *1112 (D. Ariz. June 25, 2020) (explaining the current state of the doctrine of competitive standing and collecting cases). - 21 -