Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)
11
Opinion of the Court
52. By restricting the sources of funds that campaigns may
use to repay candidate loans, Section 304 increases the risk
that such loans will not be repaid. That in turn inhibits
candidates from loaning money to their campaigns in the
first place, burdening core speech.
The data bear out the deterrent effect of Section 304. After BCRA was passed, there appeared a “clear clustering of
[candidate] loans right at the $250,000 threshold.” A.
Ovtchinnikov & P. Valta, Debt in Political Campaigns 26
(2020), Record 65–1 (Ovtchinnikov, Debt); see also Brief for
United States Senator Roy Blunt et al. as Amici Curiae 6–
7. There was no such clustering before the loan-repayment
limitation went into effect. The Government’s evidence in
the District Court, moreover, reflects that the percentage of
loans by Senate candidates for exactly $250,000 has increased tenfold since BCRA was passed. See App. 312–313.
Section 304, then, has altered “the propensity of many politicians to make large loans.” Ovtchinnikov, Debt 26; see
also Brief for Protect the First Foundation as Amicus Curiae 10–11. In doing so, it has predictably restricted a candidate’s speech on behalf of his own candidacy. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 54.
Quite apart from this record evidence, the burden on
First Amendment expression is “evident and inherent” in
the choice that candidates and their campaigns must confront. Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, 564 U. S. 721, 745 (2011); see also id., at 746 (“we
do not need empirical evidence to determinate that the law
at issue is burdensome”); Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n,
554 U. S. 724, 738–740 (2008) (requiring no empirical evidence of a burden). Although Section 304 “does not impose
a cap on a candidate’s expenditure of personal funds, it imposes an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises that First Amendment right.” Id., at 738–
739. That penalty, of course, is the significant risk that a