Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 17 Opinion of the Court disclosure offers much more robust protections against corruption” than it once did. Ibid. “Because massive quantities of information can be accessed at the click of a mouse, disclosure is effective to a degree not possible” when the Court decided earlier cases—including Colorado II. 572 U. S., at 224. Indeed, McCutcheon’s observations on that point are even more true today than they were in 2014 given continued technological advances. That transparency matters both factually and legally. Factually, as the Court has explained, disclosure can “deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.” Id., at 223 (quotation marks omitted). Disclosure can help trigger investigations of whether a donor and party have violated earmarking laws. Legally, the Court in McCutcheon stressed that “disclosure often represents a less restrictive alternative to flat bans on certain types or quantities of speech.” Ibid. To all of that, amicus and intervenors retort that the earmarking and disclosure rules, while useful, are not adequate to prevent circumvention of the base contribution limits. But especially given the significant First Amendment rights at stake here, those counterarguments are ultimately unpersuasive. As for earmarking rules, amicus and intervenors contend that they leave a gap “where a donor simply expects that his donation will go to a particular candidate, without actively directing his funds.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 43. But under this Court’s current precedents, a mere expectation or hope does not itself equate to circumvention or rise to the level of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, especially given a donor’s lack of control over the funds once contributed to the party. McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 210–211. The possibility that a political party might act in accordance with a contributor’s expectations or hopes—or is even likely to do so—is not