Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 27 Opinion of the Court reasoning applies here as well. In McCutcheon, the Court explained that “a joint fundraising committee is simply a mechanism for individual committees to raise funds collectively, not to circumvent base limits or earmarking rules.” 572 U. S., at 215. Any agreement between the donor and the committee to direct funds to a particular candidate “would trigger the earmarking provision.” Ibid. So “this circumvention scenario could not succeed without assuming” that the joint committee “would engage in a transparent violation of the earmarking rules” and that it “would not be caught” if it did. Ibid. Second, although the dissent raises concerns about money in political campaigns and about this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, the core disagreement between the Court and the dissent is legally quite narrow, albeit practically significant. See post, at 5 (opinion of KAGAN, J.) (“Our difference concerns only—though this is no small ‘only’—whether the Government’s strong interest in preventing circumvention of the base limits also justifies the coordinated-expenditure caps at issue here”). The Court and the dissent agree that the Government possesses an important interest in preventing circumvention of the base contribution limits. The Court concludes, as noted above, that the combination of the statutory base limits, earmarking rules, and disclosure requirements are sufficient to prevent circumvention of the base limits. The dissent believes that, in addition to those three statutory requirements, the statute’s coordinatedexpenditure limits are also necessary to prevent circumvention. As we stated above, that is a serious argument. But we ultimately and respectfully do not agree with the dissent on that point for the reasons already set forth at length in this opinion.