4 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N KAGAN, J., dissenting bigger, the better. To get large contributions, they may be willing to return public-policy concessions—a decision or a vote on some matter of governance. And even when that does not occur, the public can see that it might—that the incentives and opportunities are there for buying and selling policy outcomes. So Congress set strict base limits to protect both “the integrity of ” and public “confidence in” our “system of representative Government.” Id., at 26–27. In 1974, the limit was $1,000 per election. See id., at 26. Today, that limit is $3,500—or $7,000 if you count the primary and general elections together. See FEC, Contribution Limits for 2025–2026 (Jan. 30, 2025) (https://perma.cc/ 57Q5-PYKG). This Court has long recognized that those base limits comply with the First Amendment. Preventing quid pro quo corruption and its appearance is an important—indeed, a “compelling”—government interest. McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 199; see Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25–27. And the base limits are “closely drawn” to further that interest. Id., at 25. They “focus[ ] precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions,” while leaving supporters of candidates free to engage in other political activity (including small donations). Id., at 28. The limits thus target the “aspect” of political life most capable of creating “the actuality and potential for corruption.” Ibid. And to protect the base limits from easy evasion, the Court has recognized, further regulations may also be permissible. See McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 222–223; McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 171– 173 (2003); Buckley, 424 U. S., at 46–47. Again, the idea is straightforward. If a donor can circumvent the base limits through some type of routing mechanism, the limits will lose all their efficacy: They will become unable to prevent actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption. So to the extent that a campaign finance law is appropriately “tailored to the Government’s interest in preventing circumvention

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