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2 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Syllabus parties in coordination with candidates. Pp. 6–21. (1) FECA limits political-party coordinated expenditures. FECA’s limits impair the party’s traditional forms of communication such as advertisements; preclude parties from amplifying the voice of their adherents; impose additional monetary costs and burdens on political parties; and inflict a “stifling effect on the ability of the party to do what it exists to do.” Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 630 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Pp. 7–8. (2) Statutory limits on contributions to candidates or parties are subject to “closely drawn” scrutiny. McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 197 (plurality opinion). To satisfy that standard, a regulation may not be “disproportionate” and must be “necessary” and “narrowly tailored” to its asserted goal. Id., at 199, 218, 220; Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 306. The Court must assess: (i) the Government’s asserted interests in imposing the limits at issue and (ii) the fit between the limits and the Government’s asserted interests. McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 199.; see also Cruz, 596 U. S., at 305. The political-party coordinated-expenditure limits fail to satisfy the closely drawn test. Pp. 8–10. (3) To analyze FECA’s limits on political-party coordinated expenditures, the Court must first assess the asserted governmental interests justifying those limits. The Court’s precedents recognize only one constitutionally permissible government objective for campaign finance restrictions: “preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 206–207. And “Congress may target only a specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.” Id., at 207. Particularly relevant here, this Court has recognized the risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance when a donor’s contributions to a political party are earmarked—that is, “are directed, in some manner, to a candidate or officeholder.” Id., at 211 (quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the First Amendment question in this case boils down to whether FECA’s limits on political-party coordinated expenditures are permissible in order to prevent circumvention of the base limits on contributions to candidates through earmarked contributions to parties. In Colorado II, this Court said that they were. 533 U. S., at 462–463. But Colorado II applied deferential scrutiny to Congress’s politicalparty coordinated-expenditure limits. Id., at 463, n. 26, 465. Since Colorado II, however, the Court has emphasized that under the closely drawn test, judicial review must be “rigorous.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 197. Under that more demanding standard, the Court agrees with petitioners that the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits are not proportionate, necessary, and narrowly tailored given the other less-speech-restrictive tools available to the Government to prevent

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National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether FECA's limits on political parties' coordinated expenditures with candidates violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech, and specifically whether Colorado II—which upheld those limits under a deferential standard of review—remains good law in light of the Court's subsequent, more demanding campaign finance jurisprudence requiring that restrictions be "necessary," "narrowly tailored," and not "disproportionate" to the government's interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption.

Alleged Acts: The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) imposes limits on the amount a political party may spend in coordination with its candidates during political campaigns—known as "coordinated-expenditure limits." 52 U.S.C. §30116(d). These limits vary by office: for Senate candidates, the national party committee may spend between $130,600 and $4,071,800; for House candidates, between $65,300 and $130,600; and for Presidential candidates, up to $32,392,200. In 2022, the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), then-candidate for Senate JD Vance, and then-Representative Steve Chabot sued the FEC, arguing that these limits violate the First Amendment. They contend that FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. (Colorado II), 533 U.S. 431 (2001)—which upheld the limits—is no longer good law in light of the Court's more recent campaign finance decisions, particularly McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014), and FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U.S. 289 (2022). Notably, the United States (Executive Branch) agreed with plaintiffs that the limits are no longer constitutional, declining to defend them.

Procedural history: The en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' challenge and upheld FECA's coordinated-expenditure limits, applying Colorado II. However, a majority of the Sixth Circuit judges questioned Colorado II's continued vitality.

Summary: National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC is a landmark First Amendment campaign finance decision in which the Supreme Court struck down FECA's limits on political-party coordinated expenditures as unconstitutional. Writing for the 6–3 majority, Justice Kavanaugh held that existing base contribution limits, earmarking rules, and disclosure requirements together provide sufficient protection against quid pro quo corruption, making the additional coordinated-expenditure limits "disproportionate" and not "narrowly tailored." The Court formally overruled Colorado II (2001), finding its reasoning had been thoroughly undermined by subsequent precedents, particularly McCutcheon and Cruz. The dissent, authored by Justice Kagan, argued that without the caps, donors could circumvent base contribution limits by funneling large contributions through political parties to candidates, thereby reviving opportunities for quid pro quo corruption. The decision applies equally to all political parties and removes a significant regulatory constraint on party-candidate coordination.

Conclusion: In a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that FECA's political-party coordinated-expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. The Court concluded that the combination of (i) base contribution limits, (ii) earmarking rules (52 U.S.C. §30116(a)(8)), and (iii) disclosure requirements (52 U.S.C. §30104(b)) already serve as three sufficient prophylactic measures against quid pro quo corruption. The coordinated-expenditure limits would operate as a "fourth prophylaxis" that is "disproportionate" and not "necessary" given the less-speech-restrictive alternatives. The Court also noted that a majority of States do not impose similar limits on party coordinated expenditures, and no evidence of resulting corruption has materialized.

Legal Issue(s)

Campaign Finance
Conflict of Interests

Applicable Law(s): First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Federal Election Campaign Act

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Jun 30, 2026

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.8906

Longitude: -77.0047

: Geolocation

Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-621_h315.pdf

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National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission

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