Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 KAGAN, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 24–621 _________________ NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [June 30, 2026] JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting. For over half a century, a federal statute has guarded against actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption in our political system by limiting the amount of money a donor can contribute to a candidate. The law’s theory is simple: A candidate may be induced to trade official acts for campaign contributions—and the bigger the contribution, the stronger both the candidate’s temptation and the public’s suspicion. The same statute also prevents circumvention of the contribution limits by capping political parties’ “coordinated expenditures” with candidates. When a party makes such a coordinated expenditure, it essentially pays the candidate’s bills—stepping up to fund something the candidate would otherwise have to. Without limits on those expenditures, a candidate could ask a donor to make a substantial contribution to the party so as to finance his own campaign expenses. It would then be as though the candidate contribution limits did not exist: The donor could give far more to the party than to the candidate directly, understanding that the money would be passed through to the candidate. And with that evasion of contribution limits, all the old opportunities for quid pro quo deals would come back into