[55] His Lordship Rawlins J further stated at paragraph 19 that: “When a similar issue was raised in Williams v Tenby ibid, the response of the Court of Common Pleas, was clear. It stated, at page 138; “If it is [a] matter of procedure, then the judge will have some powers. But if the Act does not give these powers, then he has them not. The question still is whether the provisions of the Act are or are not peremptory. I think they are peremptory, and that the terms not complied with are conditions precedent, which ought to be complied with before the petition could be presented”.” [56] In a very enlightening manner, Justice Rawlins then proceeded to carefully examine a long line of cases including Nair v Teck (1967) 1 AC 31 and he concluded at paragraph 25: “Election statutes are therefore to be interpreted stringently and failure to comply with their requirements is fatal to the petition, unless the Court can find that the failure goes to form. This second observation by their Lordships stated, in effect, that unless election rules, or may I add, the Ordinance, confer power upon the court to amend pleadings or to extend the time within which actions are to be done under the Act, the election judge had no power to do these things. This is the general approach in other cases within and outside our jurisdiction.” [57] At paragraph 29, Rawlins J said: “In Stevens v Walwyn, our own Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that the provisions that relate to security for costs in the Constitution and Election Petition Ordinance, Cap 162 of the Laws of St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla are peremptory. It held that they impose conditions precedent, which must be complied with before a petition can be considered properly presented to the court. In Drew and Others v Scott and Others (1983) 33 W.I.R. 97, the Supreme Court of Bermuda held, inter alia, that failure to give security for costs within 3 days, as required, rendered the petition void. This survey of the general approaches in these cases provides a fitting precursor to the examination of the preliminary objections.” 20