[61] This brings the Court now to consider whether section 44(5) of the Interpretation Act is applicable. The Court accepts the position advocated by both learned Senior Counsel Mr. Martineau and Mendes that the clear wording of the section is that Sundays and public holidays are excluded in the computation of time but only where the period of time in question is six days or less. It is not open to debate that the petitions were required to be presented within 7 days. It is therefore pellucid that section 44(5) of the Interpretation Act has no relevance to the case at bar. Since section 44(5) of the Interpretation Act speaks to the computation of time in circumstances where the period in question is less than six days; it is only in those circumstances that the section stipulates that Sundays and public holidays are to be excluded. [62] To put the matter beyond any doubt, the legislature stipulates that the petition, challenging the results, must be presented within seven days after the return has been made. The law is clear that in counting the seven day period the Court is prohibited from including the day of the event. In the case at bar the Court is precluded from including the date of return namely the 13th March, 2009. There is no basis for the Court to exclude the 14th March, 2009 in its computation of time for the presentation of the petitions. The Court is fortified in this view and finds very useful the pronouncements made in the case to which Mr. Mendes SC referred namely, Williams v Burgers (1840) 12 A&E 635 in which it was held that the filing should be within 21 days after execution are to be reckoned exclusively of the day of execution. Accordingly, the Court has no doubt that in computing the 7 day period within which the petitions are to be presented simply means that the day of the return i.e. the 13th March, 2009 is excluded and the time begins to run from 14th March, 2009. At the very latest the petitions ought to have been presented no later than the 20th March, 2009 in order to be valid. [63] To reinforce the Court’s position and with the greatest of respect, the Court finds there is no proper basis for adopting the approach urged by learned Counsel Mr. Marshall Jr. and so exclude the day after the return i.e. the 14th March, 2009 from the period of computation. Neither is the Court of the respectful view that section 44(2) of the Interpretation Act supports the position as contended by the Petitioners, that the 14th 22