Wong Souk Yee v AG [2019] SGCA 25 one of the requirements is in dispute before us, namely, that the materials before the court must disclose an arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of granting the remedies sought by the applicant. 86 The requirement to obtain leave to bring judicial review proceedings is meant to “filter out groundless or hopeless cases at an early stage”, and the threshold for granting leave is a low one (see AXY at [34]). We are satisfied that this low threshold has been met here. The Appellant’s case, while ultimately unsuccessful, does disclose points on the proper interpretation of Art 49(1) which warranted further consideration. In particular, we note that it is common ground that there was a legislative oversight in the implementation of the GRC scheme (see [46] above). Further, we have found that the text of Art 49(1) is ambiguous on its face (see [47] above). 87 We therefore accept the Appellant’s argument that she should have been granted leave in the court below, although the point is academic since she has ultimately failed to obtain any of the substantive reliefs sought. Whether the Judge erred in ordering costs against the Appellant 88 The Appellant contends finally that because OS 1034 concerned public law issues of general importance, she should not have been penalised in costs in the court below, nor, for that matter, before us. 89 The Appellant’s argument is founded on the decision of the High Court in Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v Attorney-General [2013] 1 SLR 797 (“Vellama (HC)”), where, on the question of costs, the court held as follows: 39 … The Singapore courts have invoked public interest as a basis to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event with respect to proceedings involving unsuccessful regulators. … 36