MAGYAR KÉTFARKÚ KUTYA PÁRT v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT 39 Court also observes that in domestic case-law the principle of the exercise of rights in accordance with their purpose, enshrined in section 2(1)(e) of the EPA, has been relied on by the courts, including the Kúria and the Constitutional Court, to restrict election-related forms of expression. There is no question of the above legal instruments being insufficiently accessible. 109. The salient issue in the present case remains, however, whether the MKKP, in the absence of a binding provision of domestic legislation (see paragraph 26 above) explicitly regulating the taking of ballot photographs and the uploading of those photographs in an anonymous manner to a mobile application for dissemination while voting was ongoing, knew or ought to have known – if need be, after taking appropriate legal advice – that its conduct would breach the existing electoral procedure law. 110. The vagueness of the principle of “exercise of rights in accordance with their purpose”, enshrined in section 2(1)(e) of the EPA, was pointed out by the Constitutional Court in its 2008 decision. It noted that this principle had been developed by both the legal literature and the case-law relating to the prohibition of abuse of rights in civil law. It further stated that the EPA did not define what constituted a breach of the principle and did not establish any criteria for determining which situation constituted a breach of the requirement to exercise rights in accordance with their purpose, nor did it even give any examples. In the Constitutional Court’s understanding, it was likewise not possible to establish generally applicable criteria for the exercise of rights not in accordance with their purpose; rather, it fell to the NEC and eventually the domestic courts to conclude, on the basis of the examination of all the circumstances of a given case, whether a certain conduct was in breach of the principle (see decision no. 18/2008 (III.12.) AB in paragraph 34 above). 111. The Court considers that a situation entailing the judicial interpretation of principles enacted in law will not in itself necessarily fall foul of the requirement that the law should be framed in sufficiently precise terms. However, the fact remains that the domestic regulatory framework applied in the present case provided for the possibility of a restriction on voting-related expressive conduct on a case-by-case basis and therefore conferred a very wide discretion on the electoral bodies and the domestic courts that were to interpret and apply it. Consequently, the lack of clarity of section 2(1)(e) of the EPA and the potential risk inherent in its interpretation for the enjoyment of voting-related rights, including the free discussion of public affairs, called for particular caution by the domestic authorities. 112. As to the interpretation of section 2(1)(e) of the EPA, the Constitutional Court restricted the reach of the provision to voting-related conduct which entailed “negative consequences”, including the infringement of the rights of others (see paragraph 34 and 35 above). A similar approach transpires from the case-law of the Kúria (see paragraph 36 above).