an SDMA, and (4) approve the appointment of William’s aunt and a family friend as
successor supported decision-makers.
Parents noted this timely appeal, raising the following issues:
1. Was it error for the [c]ourt to associate William Pughsley’s capacity to
vote with the level of capacity needed for him to request appointment of
supporters under the Maryland Supported Decision-Making Act?
2. Was it error for the [c]ourt to fail to rule on the petition for the
appointment of Juanita Pughsley and Samuel Pughsley as Supported
Decision-Makers and for the appointment of Andrea Waring, then Dr.
Yulanda Swindell, M.D., as successor Supported Decision-Makers?
Although William “disagrees with the Parents’ . . . interpretation [of the Act] that
this new law has a general judicial ‘appointment’ element[,]” he contends that the court
“erred by assessing [his] capacity to vote in forced isolation, without evaluating how the
Parents could support him.” William frames this challenge as follows:
Did the trial court—after correctly viewing the supported decision-making
act as the core of [his] request to limit the guardianship so as to provide him
voting rights—nevertheless err by barring [his] parents from supporting him
during his testimony[?]
We conclude that the circuit court erred by applying the wrong legal standard in
disqualifying William from voting and in denying Parents’ SDMA petition for that reason.
For reasons that follow, we will vacate the order denying Parents’ petition and remand for
further proceedings regarding both voting rights and supported decision-making.
Voting Rights and Maryland’s Supported Decision-Making Act
As essential background for our discussion of the issues raised by William and his
Parents, we first examine the constitutional and statutory provisions at the heart of this
appeal.
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