an SDMA, and (4) approve the appointment of William’s aunt and a family friend as successor supported decision-makers. Parents noted this timely appeal, raising the following issues: 1. Was it error for the [c]ourt to associate William Pughsley’s capacity to vote with the level of capacity needed for him to request appointment of supporters under the Maryland Supported Decision-Making Act? 2. Was it error for the [c]ourt to fail to rule on the petition for the appointment of Juanita Pughsley and Samuel Pughsley as Supported Decision-Makers and for the appointment of Andrea Waring, then Dr. Yulanda Swindell, M.D., as successor Supported Decision-Makers? Although William “disagrees with the Parents’ . . . interpretation [of the Act] that this new law has a general judicial ‘appointment’ element[,]” he contends that the court “erred by assessing [his] capacity to vote in forced isolation, without evaluating how the Parents could support him.” William frames this challenge as follows: Did the trial court—after correctly viewing the supported decision-making act as the core of [his] request to limit the guardianship so as to provide him voting rights—nevertheless err by barring [his] parents from supporting him during his testimony[?] We conclude that the circuit court erred by applying the wrong legal standard in disqualifying William from voting and in denying Parents’ SDMA petition for that reason. For reasons that follow, we will vacate the order denying Parents’ petition and remand for further proceedings regarding both voting rights and supported decision-making. Voting Rights and Maryland’s Supported Decision-Making Act As essential background for our discussion of the issues raised by William and his Parents, we first examine the constitutional and statutory provisions at the heart of this appeal. 2

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