22. The Chamber agrees with the Minister of Justice that even though standing as a candidate in an election is not a candidate’s business or professional activity within the meaning of the Acts regulating economic and professional activity, it is nonetheless one of the main tools for a candidate’s political activity (e.g. standing as a candidate, political awareness-raising, communicating with voters and regional organisations or a political party). Therefore, in the opinion of the Chamber, political activities by a political party or a candidate on its list and by an independent candidate should also be interpreted as business or professional activity within the meaning of § 2(2) cl. 4) of the AdA. Thus, systematic interpretation of § 2(2) cl. 4) of the AdA and § 51 of the REA excludes marking a vehicle used in a politician’s professional activity with their name, contact details, trade mark, domain name and area of activity from the prohibition on political outdoor advertising. 23. On the basis of the foregoing, by interpreting § 51 of the REA and § 2(2) cl. 4) of the AdA in combination, the Chamber concludes that the prohibition on political outdoor advertising did not extend to the vehicle used by A. Talvik, and § 51 of the REA did not prohibit marking that vehicle with the information indicated in the PBGB precept. On the basis of the foregoing, § 51 of the REA is not a relevant provision in the instant case. 24. Since the Supreme Court can only decide ? within constitutional review court proceedings in the frame of specific constitutional review ? on the constitutionality of a provision which needs to be applied for adjudicating the case, the Supreme Court is unable to resolve the application by Tallinn Court of Appeal. Under § 15(1) cl. 6) of the Constitutional Review Court Procedure Act, the application by Tallinn Court of Appeal must be dismissed. Source URL: https://www.riigikohus.ee/en/constitutional-judgment-3-4-1-3-17

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