3 HH 307-18 HC 4863/18 5.5 to facilitate the engagement of election stakeholders in electoral reform and voter mobilization. 5.6 generally, to do anything that the Board considers necessary or desirable to advance participatory electoral democracy in Zimbabwe.” The trust can aptly be described as an educational and benevolent trust founded upon the broad desire to promote the informed participation of the Zimbabwe citizenry in election related matters. Elections are an integral part of a constitutional democracy. Zimbabwe is a constitutional democracy and its constitution provides in s 67 thereof for the right of every Zimbabwean citizen to engage in political activities including voting in all elections and referendums to which the constitution applies, subject to the constitutional and constitutionally provided for legislative limitations. The objectives of the trust are varied, and if adhered to, noble. They present themselves for commendation by constitutionalists and human rights advocates alike. The applicants’ objectives are in sync with s 44 of the constitution which reposes upon the state and virtually all and sundry to respect, promote and fulfil fundamental human rights and freedoms set out in Chapter 4, (Declaration of Rights). I have digressed a bit to comment on the judicial character and objectives of the applicant in order that its objectives at least on paper, are not misunderstood given the focus which applications to do with elections and electoral processes attract. Indeed Mr Kanengoni in the course of his oral submission which I will deal with later adverted to what he perceived as the opaqueness of the applicant’s intentions in asking for the relief which it seeks. He submitted that the applicants’ request for the provisional voters roll was precipitate or premature at this stage. The applicant avers that its trustees, acting on its behalf, petitions the court on the back of the locus standi given in s 85 (1) of the Constitution. Section 85 (1) (a) entitles any person acting “in their own interests” to approach a court for appropriate relief including a declaration of rights and a compensatory order where such person proves or establishes an infringement, actual or prospective, of a fundamental right or freedom enshrined in Chapter 4 of the Constitution. In Chihava and another v Provincial Magistrate Mapfumo and another CCZ 6/2015, GWAUNZA JCC in her judgment wherein the whole Constitutional bench agreed, stated that upon its literal interpretation, s 85 (1) (a) in its wording does not place any restrictions on the type of person who is given entitlement in terms thereof to approach the Constitutional court directly. I however note that the constitution in this regard and in s 332 thereof describes person as “… an individual or a