which sounds in the area of free and fair election, namely, delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to such constituencies is put beyond the cognizance of court. When it is found that the task of writing the legislation on the subject has been committed to parliament and state legislatures by the Constitution, is it competent for a court to test its validity on the basis of some vague norms of free and fair election? I think not. As I said, like other laws made by parliament or state legislatures, the laws made under Articles 327 and 328 are liable to be tested by Part III of the Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution: but it is difficult to see how these laws could be challenged on the ground that they do not conform to some ideal notions of free and fair election to be evolved by the court from out of airy nothing. 352. The doctrine of the 'spirit' of the Constitution is a slippery slope. The courts are not at liberty to declare an act void, because, in their opinion, it is opposed to the spirit of democracy or republicanism supposed to pervade the Constitution but not expressed in words. When the fundamental law has not limited, either in terms or by necessary implication, the general powers conferred upon the legislature, we cannot declare a limitation under the notion of having discovered some ideal norm: of free and fair election. 353. Cooley has observed that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes void because they appear to the minds of the judges to violate fundamental principles of republican government, unless it shall be found that those principles are placed beyond legislative encroachment by the Constitution. The principles of democratic republican government are not a set of inflexible rules: and unless they are specifically incorporated in the Constitution, no law can be declared bad merely because the Court thinks that it is opposed to some implication drawn from the concept. * 354. Counsel for the respondent, relied upon the observations of Sikri, C. J. at p. 216. Shelat and Grover JJ. at p. 292, Hegde and Mukherjea. JJ. at p. 355 and Reddy. J. at p. 556 in their judgments in Bharati's case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) in support of his contention that when these Acts were put in the Ninth Schedule by the constitutional amendment, their provisions became vulnerable to attack if they or any one of them damaged or destroyed the basic features of democracy or republicanism. 355. Sikri, C. J. has said that the Constitution 29th Amendment Act, 1971, is ineffective to protect the immugned Acts there if they abrogate or take away fundamental rights. This would not show that the learned Chief Justice countenanced any challenge to an Act on the ground that he basic structure of the constitution has been damaged or destroyed by its provisions not constituted by the fundamental rights abrogated or taken away. In other words, if by taking away or abridging the fundamental rights, the basic structure of the Constitution is damaged or destroyed, then according to the learned Chief Justice, the legislation would be vulnerable on that score, even though it is put in the Ninth Schedule by a constitutional amendment. But it would not follow that an Act so put can be challenged for a reason not resulting from the taking away or abrogation of the fundamental right. To