clear. Section 79 of the Act indicates that the definitions therein have to be read subject to the context. 385. The legislature must fix some point of time before which a person can not be a 'candidate' in an election and a wide latitude must be given to the legislature in fixing that point. In Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works Civil Appeals Nos. 262-273, 587-591 and 1351-1402 of 1971 and 18831921 of 1972. D/- 4-11-1974 = (reported in AIR 1974 SC 2349) this Court observed: "The choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line of point there must be and there is no mathematial or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature of its delegate must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of the reasonable mark. See Louisville Gas Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 240 US 30 at p. 32 per Justice Holmes." 386. The learned Chief Justice has in his judgment referred to the relevant English statues and the decisions of the English Courts bearing on this point and has pointed out the difference between the English Law and the Indian Law. I do not consider it necessary to cover the same ground. I agree with his conclusion on the point. 387. I would therefore hold that even if it be assumed that the finding of the High Court that the appellant obtained or procured the assistance of Shri Yashpal Kapur during the period from January 7 to 24, 1971 is correct the appellant shall not be deemed to have committed corrupt practice under Section 123 (7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 as she became a candidate only on February 1, 1971. The learned Chief Justice has also dealt with the contention urged by counsel for respondent that Clause 8 (b) of the Election Laws Amendment Act, 1975 suffers from the vice of excessive delegation and is arbitrary I agree with his reasoning for repelling the same. 388. There can be no dispute that if the Election Laws Amendment Act 1975 is valid the appeal has to be allowed. I would therefore, set aside the finding of the High Court against the appellant and allow the appal without any order as to costs. In the cross appeal, the only question raised was about the correctness of the finding of the High Court that the appellant has not exceeded the prescribed limit of election expense. For the reasons given by Khanna. J. in his judgment I hold that the finding of the High Court on this issue was correct. In this view, I have no occasion to reach the other questions argued. I would dismiss the cross appeal without any order as to costs. BEG. J. : – 389. There are two Election Appeals Nos. 887 and 909 of 1975 before us under Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act of 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). They are directed against decisions on different issues contained in the same judgment of a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing an election petition filed by Shri Raj Narain (hereinafter referred to as the 'Election Petitioner'), a defeated candidate at