criteria of basic constitutional purpose and constitutionally prescribed procedure. The assumption underlying the theory of judicial review of all law making including fundamental law making is that Courts acting as interpreters of what has been described by some political philosophers (See: Bosanquet's "Philosophical Theory of the State" Chap. V, p 96-115) as the "Real Will" of the people embodied in their Constitution and assumed to be more lasting and just and rational and less liable to err than their "General Will" reflected by the opinions of the majorities in Parliament and the State Legislatures for the time being can discover for the people the not always easily perceived purposes of their Constitution. The Courts thus act as agents and mouthpieces of the "Real Will" of the people themselves. Although, Judges, in discharging their onerous constitutional duties cannot afford to ignore the limitations of the judicial technique and their own possibly greater liability to err than legislators could on socio-economic issues and matters of either social philosophy or practical policy, or political opinion only yet they cannot without violating their oaths of office, fail to elucidate and up hold a basic constitutional principle or norm unless compelled by the law of the Constitution to abstain from doing so. One of these basic principles seems to me to be that, just as Courts are not constitutionally competent to legislate under the guise of interpretation so also neither our Parliament nor any State Legislature in the purported exercise of any kind of law making power perform an essentially judicial function by virtually withdrawing a particular case pending in any Court and taking upon itself the duty to decide it by an application of law or its own standards to the facts of that case. This power must at least be first constitutionally taken away from the Court concerned and vested in another authority before it can be lawfully exercised by that other authority. It is not a necessary or even a natural incident of a "Constituent power" As Hans Kelsen points out in his "General Theory of Law and the State." (See p 143), "while creation and annulment of all general norms whether basic or not so basic is essentially a legislative function their interpretation and application to findings reached after a correct ascertainment of facts involved in an individual case by employing the judicial technique is really a judicial function. Neither of the three constitutionally separate organs of State can according to the basic scheme of our Constitution today leap out side the boundaries of its own constitutionally assigned sphere or orbit of authority into that of the other. This is the logical and natural meaning of the principle of Supremacy of the Constitution. 395. Issues raised before us relating to the validity of the 39th Amendment and the Acts of 1974 and 1975 were: What are the Constitutional purposes and ambit of the "Constituent power" found in Article 368 of our Constitution? Were they in any way exceeded by the constituent authorities in making the 39th amendment in an unauthorised manner or for objects which however laudable were outside the scope of Article 368? Was there any procedural irregularity in the composition of Parliament which could enable this Court to hold that there was a basic